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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the defense and budget planning processes in the 
Armed Forces of Ukraine. Currently, there is a growing need to establish an effective 
system of defense planning in the armed forces as well as for integrating that system of 
planning with budget planning to create a single system. This integrated system would 
provide an opportunity to create reliable mechanisms that would enhance the efficiency 
and quality of budget management in the MoD and would make this process more 
flexible and transparent. The scientific value of the work presented in this thesis is in the 
critical analysis of the defense and budget planning state in the MoD and the armed 
forces. Also valuable is the research on effective methods for the improvement of these 
processes. The most significant areas of difficulty related to intermediate and long-term 
planning are identified, and the techniques for the macroeconomic analysis and 
forecasting of resource support for the armed forces based on the Cobb-Douglas 
production function are proposed. 
In this thesis all stages of the defense planning and budgeting processes were 
studied, weaknesses in the allocation of defense resources revealed, and the mechanism 
for their effective use proposed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The world is not going to be safer in the near future. Global economic, 
environmental, ethnic, religious, and other differences are growing, and no effective 
means of overcoming them has yet been found. Moreover, this century has seen the 
emergence of new conflicts being waged with new tools and rules of warfare to achieve 
new goals. As a result, states spend billions of dollars for defense needs to acquire 
material resources, to support personnel, and to conduct training. 
The question arises: how can Ukraine effectively manage its national resources, 
including budgeting funds for defense? Also, what instruments or approaches for optimal 
algorithms and decision-making systems should be applied? A production function that 
was developed by Charles Cobb and Paul Douglas (called the Cobb-Douglas production 
function) can be used to analyze development within the Ukrainian Armed Forces and to 
predict future trends. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The importance of this research is that, in the current situation, there is a growing 
need to establish an effective system of defense planning in the Ukrainian Armed Forces 
as well as to integrate defense planning with budget planning. This would provide an 
opportunity to create reliable mechanisms to enhance the efficiency and quality of budget 
management in the Ministry of Defense (MoD). An integrated system would make this 
process more flexible and transparent. After the ultimate goals are identified during the 
defense planning process, it would be possible to monitor the status of their 
implementation.   
It requires leadership at all levels of command and during all stages of the defense 
planning process to respond to changing circumstances and to make rational management 
decisions that will achieve the highest priority goals. However, before the budget 
proposal is submitted, it is imperative to determine how funds will be allocated among 
the following three categories: personnel, training, and equipment and infrastructure.  
 2 
A scientific approach should provide an unbiased answer to all interested parties 
competing for state budget funding.   
C. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES 
The state budget is only one source for financing the Ukrainian Armed Forces. 
According to Hitch and McKean national security depends on “the quantity of national 
resources available, now and in the future; the proportion of these resources allocated to 
national security purposes; and the efficiency with which the resources so allocated are 
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2006 8748.4 6407.4 1.18 4402 68.7 625.3 9.8 1380.1 21.5 
2007 10283.4 8078.2 1.12 5973.2 73.9 789 9.8 1316 16.3 
2008 11835.6 9495.2 1.00 7311 77.0 747 7.8 1437.2 15.2 
2009 13044.8 8323 0.91 6988.2 84.0 732 8.8 602.8 7.2 
2010 14140.3 10242.2 0.95 8933.4 87.2 551.2 5.4 757.6 7.4 
2011 15368.6 12295.1 0.94 10673.6 86.8 520.2 4.2 1101.3 9.0 
Table 1.   State of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Financing from 2006–2011.* 
* The financial indexes are represented without notice of expenditures of the Main Directorate of 
Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. 
 
 
                                                 
1 C. Hitch and R. McKean. The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age. (Cambridge, MA:  
Harvard University Press, 1967), 19. 
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Recently the State Program of the Armed Forces’ Development 2006–2011 was 
finished. During those six years the underfunding of the State Program was 18.6 billion 
Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH), which is approximately one quarter of the whole amount for 
its implementation. Thus, from 2006 to 2011 the State Program was not fully 
implemented. The allocated amounts were sufficient mainly for the maintenance of the 
Armed Forces but not for training troops at the proper level or for maintenance of 
weapons and military equipment.2  Implementation of activities of the Armed Forces’ 
development received only 39% of the funding. 
At the same time we have the new challenging task of solving defense problems 
under the Non-Bloc status of Ukraine. It requires increasing the effectiveness of 
command and control, upgrading the level of the personnel training, and improving 
resources and logistical support. How should the Armed Forces address these challenges, 
especially if the level of financing (that is, the share of the budget or gross domestic 
product (GDP)) is so low? 
Another problem is allocating available resources among activities. If we compare 
the division of funds by functional appropriations we can see that we spend a huge 
amount of money on personnel. It means that the training expenditure is not sufficient, 
and the procurement of new equipment and infrastructure is residual. We can say that 
until now in Ukraine we have not had a clear solution on how to optimize the cost of 
defense, how to allocate resources via rational planning, and finally, how to improve 
overall efficiency. We can use many different tools for resource allocation analysis, and 
one of them is the Cobb-Douglas production function.  
The Cobb-Douglas production function is widely used to represent the 
relationship of output and two inputs, and can be used both on macro and micro levels of 
economics. This thesis applies the Cobb-Douglas production function to explore the 
relationship between “labor” and “capital.” In this case “personnel” expenditure will 
represent “labor” and “equipment and infrastructure” will stand for “capital.” This 
                                                 
2 President of Ukraine, Decree of 27.06.2008 № 598/2008, On the Decision of the National Security 
and Defense Council of Ukraine of 30 May 2008 “On a defense review.” 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/598/2008. 
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allocation is crucial not only for the development of the army but for the economy as a 
whole, and in the long run it will be reflected in state growth. It is also interesting to think 
about how to make growth sustainable, what factors determine fluctuation, and which 
factors will help build the virtual circle. Unfortunately, the Cobb-Douglas production 
function was not really developed in the context of government expenditure for defense, 
so my research has a portion of novelty. Before applying the Cobb-Douglas production 
function to establish a set of critical elements to define the balance for steady growth, it is 
necessary to do a literature review. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
First of all, it is interesting to combine different sources that mention the Cobb-
Douglas production function and that may be applicable for my thesis. A production 
function is a mathematical expression that describes a systematic relationship between 
inputs and output in an economy, and the Cobb-Douglas is a function that has been used 
extensively. Research about the production function has a long history. The economist 
Paul H. Douglas and mathematician Charles W. Cobb created it in an effort to fit 
Douglas’s empirical results for production, employment, and capital stock in U.S. 
manufacturing into a simple function (Cobb and Douglas, 1928).3 Since that time “many 
studies have tended to support the hypothesis that production processes are well 
described by a linear homogeneous function with an elasticity of substitution of one 
between factors.”4 




Y = total production 
L = labor input (the total number of person-hours worked in a year) 
K = capital input (the monetary worth of all machinery, equipment, and buildings) 
A = total factor productivity 
                                                 
3 C. Cobb and P. Douglas, “A Theory of Production,” American Economic Review 18, (1928), 139–
165. 
4 P. H. Douglas, “The Cobb-Douglas Production Function Once Again: Its History, Its Testing, and 
Some New Empirical Values,” Journal of Political Economy 84, no. 5 (January 01, 1976), 903. 
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α and β are the output elasticity of capital and labor, respectively. These values 
are constants determined by available technology. 
 
Or it can be written like   
with the solution as     
Since Q 1/(1-β) is a constant along the projection, this is a hyperbola, and it has a 









Figure 1.  Different Possibilities of Production Functions. 
The production functions were originally designed with an individual firm in 
mind but macroeconomists, such as Miller, came to realize that this methodology 
provides a useful tool for estimating certain parameters that cannot be directly measured 
from national accounts data.5 The most important of these is the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labor. So, the Cobb-Douglas production function lay between two 
extremes. 
                                                 
5 E. Miller, (2008). An Assessment of CES and Cobb-Douglas Production Functions. (Washington, 
























Taking that into account, Miller concludes that the elasticity of substitution 
provides a powerful tool for answering analytical questions about the funds distribution 
between capital and labor. If the markets are competitive, then factors will be paid their 
marginal product. He summarizes that “the wage rate will equal the marginal contribution 
from an additional worker and the return on capital will match the contribution in output 
that a marginal increment of capital provides.”6 In other words, if σ = 1, constant shares 
of output are allocated to capital and labor, even though the capital-labor ratio may 
change over time. If σ > 1, then a given percentage change in K/L will exceed the 
associated percentage change in w/r (where w is the wage rate and r is the rental rate of 
capital), and vice versa. The opposite result occurs when σ < 1; an increase in the ratio 
K/L would tend to lower capital’s share because the relative price of labor would rise in 
response to the increase in the amount of capital per worker.  
In my case it is interesting to explore flexibility and the relationship between the 
“personnel” and the “equipment and infrastructure” because the budget of the MoD has 
been “eating away budget” since it had no resources available for combat readiness 
renewal or development of the Armed Forces. The average annual percentage of the 
defense sector financing during the period of 2006–2011 was 1.0% of GDP; the majority 
of the funds (about 80%) was used for the maintenance of troops. The question is whether 
it is only because of underfunding of the State Program or something else?7  One way to 
determine whether we can find an answer is to compare the structure of NATO countries’ 
expenditures. It is possible to discover the interdependence between the production of 
“labor” and return of the “capital.”  
In this instance, to determine the current situation and to identify any applicable 
constraints such as budget, policies, and technological progress, it is important to 
understand where we are. On the road to the perfect budget we have some constraints. 
First of all, it should take a macro-level view. 
                                                 
6 Miller, An Assessment of CES and Cobb-Douglas Production Functions, 5. 
7 V. Mozharovskyi et al. The White Book 2011: Armed Forces of Ukraine. (Kyiv: Ministry of Defense 
of Ukraine, 2012), 10. 
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The Ukrainian government has forecast that country’s gross domestic product will 
grow by up to 3.4%.8 At the same time leading international economic organizations 
have a different opinion on this matter. “The Ukrainian economy is running a substantial 
external deficit, which may require devaluation,” according to the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. It also adopted a much gloomier view on Ukraine, 
“now seeing an economic contraction of 0.5%, having in January expected growth of 
1.0%.”9 “Ukraine’s economic performance has weakened since we last lowered our 
ratings,” as Standard & Poor’s has said. “The ratings on Ukraine are constrained by our 
view of political uncertainty, financial sector stress, and weak external liquidity.”10 As a 
result, Standard & Poor’s trimmed its forecast for average 2013–2015 GDP growth to 
2.5% from 4.1%. The International Monetary Fund has downgraded the forecast for GDP 
in Ukraine in 2013 to zero from 3.5% in October 2012. “After almost a zero growth in 
2012 due to trade conditions decline, GDP growth will remain pressured in 2013, if the 
economic policies would not change.”11  
This unfavorable current position of Ukraine is a reason why the next article 
attracted my close attention. It is quite possible that for a different country with a 
different level of development the same input from “labor” and “capital” would bring 
different results in effectiveness, efficiency, and output. Such a situation is examined in 
“Productivity Growth in Latin America,” written by Dr. Henry J. Bruton in 1967. Dr. 
Bruton has a Ph.D. from Harvard University with main fields of specialization in 
technological change, development economics, and productivity growth in less developed 
countries. He has country experience in Egypt, Iran, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and Chile. Unfortunately, I cannot classify Ukraine as a well-developed country either.  
                                                 
8 Interfax International Information Group, Interfax-Ukraine. Bulletin, Kyiv, November 28, 2012. 
http://www.interfax.co.uk/ukraine-news/cabinet-approves-2013-macro-forecast-with-3–4-gdp-growth-4–8-
inflation-3/ 
9 P. Hannon, “EBRD Cuts Forecasts For Russia, East Europe,” Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2013. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323744604578474450778425048.html .  
10 D. Krasnolutska, “Ukraine Rating Affirmed by S&P as Negative Outlook Kept,” Bloomberg, May 
16, 2013. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013–05–16/ukraine-rating-affirmed-by-s-p-as-negative-
outlook-kept.html. 
11 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Hopes, Realities, Risks, (April 2013), 65. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/pdf/c2.pdf. 
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The purpose of his paper, according to Bruton (1967), is to examine the growth of 
GDP in five Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico – 
henceforth referred to as LAC) in the period of 1940–1964 in terms of hypotheses about 
possible explanations of the “residual” source of growth in these countries.12 
The author does not make it a goal to describe the Cobb-Douglas production 
function. (Actually, the value of this research is in the applied aspect rather than the 
theory). The author refers readers to a recently provided review about all aspects of the 
model in Richard Nelson’s (1964) paper and only defines symbols and notes points of 
special relevance for later discussion.13 Nelson, in his paper “Aggregate Production 
Functions and Medium-Range Growth Projections,” includes several models that were 
quite similar in basic concept but focuses on different variables in a general framework. 
In this case different assumptions and implications can be compared and evaluated. 
So Bruton’s paper will be interesting because of its scope and analytical approach, 
as well as its examination of drivers of growth and the interdependence that the aggregate 
production function can help clarify. The author in his paper has chosen countries from 
the same region (Latin America) and analyzed the mean values (regression coefficients) 
from 1940 to 1964. At the same time he compared this data with another group of 
countries named the advanced group (AG) from 1949 to 1960. The only reason the author 
provided for doing so is, “The logic of the time periods chosen for the Latin American 
group is indicated as we proceed.”14 Countries in the AG represent the whole world (such 
as North America, Europe, Far and Middle East) and serve as a control indicator. But is it 
correct to compare the LAC during the war time of 1940–1945 with no data from the AG 
at all? He wrote, “While these percentages for LAC are based on incomplete data, they 
are consistent with a substantial body of evidence, and can be taken as a close 
approximation to what complete data would indicate.”15 
                                                 
12 H. J. Bruton, “Productivity Growth in Latin America,” The American Economic Review 57, no. 5 
(1967), 1099–1116. 1109. 
13 R. R. Nelson, “Aggregate Production Functions and Medium-Range Growth Projections,” The 
American Economic Review 54, no.5 (September 1, 1964), 575. 
14 Bruton, “Productivity Growth in Latin America,” 1101. 
15 Ibid., 1102. 
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The data used for analysis are very important for further investigation. On the one 
hand, it should be a sufficient period of time for regression analysis (at least 20 years 
when talking about countries). On the other hand, it should be consistent for comparison 
with a standard sample. For the Ukrainian Armed Forces the discussion should focus on 
the whole period of independence since 1991, paying close attention to the huge 
reduction of personnel strength.  
Alexander Gerschenkron succeeded as an economic historian in explaining 
dependence of the development of the countries. His key assumption is that the 
industrialization process of backward countries is significantly different from that of 
developed ones not only in industrial growth, but also in the productive and 
organizational structures of the industry that it accompanied. Gerschenkron argued that 
possibilities of industrialization in some countries are directly dependent on the degree of 
backwardness.16 The more innovation the countries can implement, the greater the 
potential for industrialization they have. 
Comparing mean values of growth rates in the two samples, Bruton found 
contrary results to the frequently encountered notion that less developed countries with a 
somewhat primitive technological base may reap large windfalls by exploiting recently 
developed knowledge. Further in the text he explained this situation by exploring the role 
of capital in production function, “This equation shows, contrary to expectations, that 
inputs are not carriers of the sources of productivity growth.”17 This sort of logic is 
appealing; it means that the author would not like to prove some facts with data but rather 
to explain data that he collected. That is more important because, for example, talking 
about Ukraine and its failure to implement the State Program of the Armed Forces’ 
Development 2006–2011, it is too obvious to say it is “just because of money.” 
Definitely, Ukraine had to cancel the program earlier when the deviation exceeded 20% 
and develop the new one; yet it had not previously examined all drivers that influenced 
the program. 
                                                 
16 A. Gerschenkron, “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective,” in The Political Economy 
Reader: Markets as Institutions, ed. N. Barma and S. Vogel (New York: Routledge, 2008), 222–227. 
17 Bruton, “Productivity Growth in Latin America,” 1107. 
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Bruton’s principal results consist of two tables, many equations, and lots of 
explanations that explore the role of capital and the role of productivity growth. What is 
not well-developed is the contribution of education. While he mentioned at the beginning 
of his research that contributions to productivity growth of embodied technology 
improved education, and that better allocation must then be made directly to education, 
later on we read the following: 
It is also probably correct to assume that the rate of growth and of 
improvement in the educational establishments was greater in the former 
group than in the latter. In terms then of the customarily identified sources 
of rA, technical advance and education, the Latin American countries 
lagged. This argument is intuitively appealing, but its validity depends 
very much on the assumption as to the sources of productivity growth. 
–Bruton 
Unfortunately, we do not have a clear explanation of how it works in the LAC 
sample. According to the author, increases in productivity result from improvements 
embodied in capital equipment and from better-educated, better-trained workers, which 
suggests that rates of growth and productivity should move together. Thus, for the AG 
sample a positive and significant relationship is expected. Yet the equation he has shown 
us is contrary to any expectations, that inputs are not carriers of productivity growth 
sources, so for the AG this rate was simply added to whatever growth was produced by 
increased inputs. Bruton proposed the same interpretation for the LAC sample in the first 
case for AG r2 = 0.02 and approximately the same for LAC r2 = 0. He concluded that the 
rate of productivity growth is dependent on changes in the degree of utilization and little 
or no independent growth of “pure” productivity. According to the data this conclusion is 
true, but the relationship is still questionable, especially for developed countries. And 
again, education (or in our case, military training) is a very important driver that, aside 
from “labor” and “capital,” can add synergy for overall growth.  
The summary for this article is somewhat vague. For example, Bruton wrote that 
his findings are “…probably not adequate to explain inflation in Latin America,” and “the 
rate of capital formation … has generally been quite high, and this fact is difficult to 
reconcile,” and “a detailed investigation would require a country-by-country survey.18 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 1109, 1110, 1112. 
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Such a survey is not possible here,” except in “In a very general sense.” Perhaps his 
reservations are due to the different time frames for the LAC and the AG studies, as well 
as the fact that data during war time was greatly distorted.  
Yet, when the author explained the behavior of growth by examining these 
periods separately, he found relevant characteristics “that [were] consistent with the 
hypothesis that in neither LAC nor AG are inputs (capital and labor) the carrier of 
productivity growth.”19  Again, using the same timeframe for both groups of countries 
Bruton concludes “that ‘pure’ productivity growth has been virtually zero in LAC in the 
past decade or so” and gave a brief explanation of this result.  
What is especially interesting is that at the very end of his paper he mentions that 
if productivity growth is an important element in development, then appropriate resource 
allocation is crucial for development policy. In my case, I have to pay close attention to a 
reduction of personnel (labor) while simultaneously increasing productivity via training. 
In other words, it is a strong argument for ending conscription and establishing a 
professional army. 
Another factor that can (and probably should) significantly influence the future 
defense spending policy is Ukraine’s declared neutral status. Talking about Ukrainian 
Armed Forces, Ukraine proclaimed a Non-Bloc status.20 Such a status requires a new 
Armed Forces model since the threats remain the same, but the forces aimed at resisting 
those threats should be increased (not necessarily in the number of people), as Ukraine 
can no longer count on help from another bloc member. That means a new strategy and 
concept have to be developed. At the same time in relatively new documents it was stated 
that the reform of Security Sector and Defense should be an integrated system: the 
stabilization of the situation in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the end of reducing their 
combat capability and combat readiness, the maintenance of officer and NCO corps, the 
optimization of their structure and strength, the improvement of technical readiness of 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 1115. 




weapons and upgrade of its structure, the improvements in combat training, the 
reorganization of operational (combat) and material maintenance and formation on this 
basis. Although small in number, the effective professional Armed Forces of Ukraine are 
able to perform the task of defending the state in terms of a non-aligned policy.21 
An increase in funding for training and acquisition is possible only in the case of 
reallocation of money from the “personnel” category. To reduce the number of Armed 
Forces personnel, we need even more resources. Substantially and simultaneously 
reducing the number of people (Labor) does not seem possible because the process 
requires more money than is used for their maintenance. If we fire an officer, he must be 
paid compensation. If a military family is in line for housing, it must be provided an 
apartment. If we close a military base, we need to recultivate the land, and so on. 
On the other side, increased training is impossible without a sufficient amount of 
available and ready ships, aircraft, tanks, etc. (Capital). In this case it should be noted that 
we do not have the technological capacity to repair all units that we need immediately 
(e.g., we do not have a sufficient number of dry docks for ships). Again, the main 
purpose is to provide the needs of security and defense on the principle of defense 
sufficiency, balanced with resources, using resource capabilities of the State to protect 
Ukraine’s national interests from existing and potential threats. 
In any case, it is of interest to compare Ukrainian defense expenditures (shown in 
Table 1) with defense expenditures of NATO countries (see Table 2).22 Another useful 
source for analysis is the recent study, “European Defense Trends 2012: Budgets, 
Regulatory Frameworks, and the Industrial Base.”23 This report analyzes national 
                                                 
21 President of Ukraine, Decree of 08.06.2012 № 389/2012, On Decision of the National Security and 
Defense Council of Ukraine on June 8, 2012 On the New Version of the National Security Strategy of 
Ukraine, http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/389/2012. 
22 NATO. “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defense. Defense Expenditures of NATO 
Countries (1990–2011),” Communiqué, PR/CP(2012)047-REV1, April 13, 2012, 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2012_04/20120413_PR_CP_2012_047_rev1.pdf. 
23 J. Hofbauer, R. Levy, G. Sanders, G. Ben-Ari, D. Berteau, European Defense Trends 2012: 
Budgets, Regulatory Frameworks, and the Industrial Base (Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, December 18, 2012). 
https://csis.org/files/attachments/121218_EuropeReport%202012_EventSlides.pdf .   
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defense budgets of 37 European countries. Moreover, it assesses European defense trends 
in policies and capabilities.  
 
Country GDP, % Personnel, % Equipment, % Infrastructure, % Other, % 
Albania 1.5 77.1 13.4 0.8 8.8 
Belgium 1.1 75.4 6.4 1.7 16.5 
Bulgaria 1.4 67.4 6.3 1.5 24.8 
Canada 1.4 42.5 17.5 4.5 35.5 
Croatia 1.5 69 12.2 0.8 18 
Czech Republic 1.1 56 13.2 2.9 27.8 
Denmark 1.4 52.2 9.7 1.5 36.7 
Estonia 1.7 32.3 10.1 13.6 44 
France 1.9 49.4 28.2 2.7 19.8 
Germany 1.4 52.3 16.4 4.1 27.2 
Greece 2.1 73.9 6.9 0.9 18.3 
Hungary 1 55.2 13.1 1.1 30.6 
Italy 1.4 74.8 11.7 1.3 12.2 
Latvia 1 51.3 10.8 9.3 28.6 
Lithuania 0.8 68.3 10.1 1.7 19.9 
Luxembourg 0.5 44.3 28.4 11.2 16.1 
Netherlands 1.3 53.8 13.6 3.8 28.8 
Norway 1.5 43.4 17 4.2 35.3 
Poland 1.7 58.2 16.1 4.8 20.9 
Portugal 1.5 78.5 8.8 1.4 11.2 
Romania 1.3 80 7.5 1.4 11.1 
Slovak Republic 1.1 69.5 7.1 1 22.4 
Slovenia 1.3 74.6 5.7 2.6 17.1 
Spain 0.9 64.8 6.7 1.9 26.6 
Turkey 1.9 50.2 28.6 2.7 18.5 
United Kingdom 2.6 35.7 24.5 1.6 38.3 
United States 4.8 41.4 26.5 1.1 31 
NATO - Total 1.52 58.94 13.94 3.19 23.93 
 
Table 2.   Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP and Distribution of Total 
Defense Expenditures by Category, 201124 
                                                 
24 NATO. “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defense.”  
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The most valuable aspect of this report is the wealth of data relating to European 
defense between 2001 and 2011. In his book, The Impact of Human Capital on Economic 
Growth: A Case Study in Post-Soviet Ukraine, 1989–2009, Osipian covers approximately 
the same period of time but from a slightly different approach.25 It is all about Ukraine, 
but more focused on economic growth, paying special attention to the impact of human 
capital. 
It is also interesting to understand how Planning Programming and Budgeting 
Systems (PPBS) developed in different countries. Nhemachena, Chiabrishvili, and Sewell 
represent Zimbabwe, Georgia, and Jamaica, respectively. These countries represent 
different regions, but face approximately the same problem. In this example we can see 
the genesis of each country’s PPBS up to its implementation via transition and 
adjustment at different stages depending on diverse circumstances that may be interesting 
for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. 
For example, the Zimbabwe Defense Force faces a resource crisis that threatens 
its capability to fulfill its mission. At the same time the ability of the country’s economy 
to sustain the modernization program is questionable through the same period. In his 
paper, Nhemachena examines the budgetary process of his country, giving us a detailed 
description of budgeting systems, and in particular the PPBS. He mentions that his 
country recently implemented a multi-year plan and program as well as a three-year 
rolling budget system.26 This information will be especially useful for the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces in the context of similar processes that are taking place now. 
The Georgian experience deserves further study because it is a former republic of 
the Soviet Union. Georgia implemented many successful reforms on its way into NATO. 
Overcoming the economic decline that happens to most countries in transition, Georgia 
faced the negative effects of instability in the defense reform process, especially in the 
implementation of the PPBS. Particularly in 2004, “Georgia [was] about halfway from 
                                                 
25 A. L. Osipian,  The Impact of Human Capital on Economic Growth: A Case Study in Post-Soviet 
Ukraine, 1989–2009 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
26 C. R. Nhemachena,  “Defense Budgeting in a Constrained Economy: Reengineering the Budget 
Process to Meet the Challenge of a Modernizing Zimbabwe Defense Force” (published thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School) (Springfield, VA.: National Technical Information Service, 1998), 53, 54. 
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Defense Budgeting in the narrow sense to a broader understanding.”27 The solution 
proposed by Chiabrishvili looks at the MoD as a public sector agency, and it is the reason 
that the MoD has to focus on its outputs, outcomes, and metrics.28 
In his paper, Sewell also examines the resource allocation process for the national 
security in his country. The purpose of his study is to establish whether the current 
process is adequate to the country’s expenditure; he gives us an explanation of how much 
to allocate to defense with the consideration of all other viable alternatives. It is worth 
studying lessons from the theoretical approach to resource allocation for defense.29 
Studies showing that performance can be improved with additional personnel 
and/or higher education levels will be particularly useful for better resource allocation in 
the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Assuming that we reduce the number of staff but increase 
its professionalism (with more intense training), we can achieve even better overall 
results. This study attempts to relate inputs to outputs by using the Cobb-Douglas 
production function.30 Feuring used regression analysis, and the results show positive 
effects of human capital on performance. In another case that used the Cobb-Douglas 
production function extensively, Jayachandran shows the analytical procedures for a 
sensitivity analysis of a cost estimate.31 “This approach is accurate for linear cost models 
and can be upgraded for non-linear models by adding higher order terms to the 
differential.”32 In this example the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas model are taken from 
historical data. Further the model can be used to assess the effects of small changes in 
parameter values on the total cost. 
                                                 
27 M. Chiabrishvili, “Economic Security Environment and Implementation of Planning Programming, 
Budgeting, Execution (PPBE) System in Georgia” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 48. 
28 Ibid.. 81. 
29 A. F. Sewell, Prospects for Improving the Resource Allocation Process for National Security in 
Jamaica: A Comparative Study (Ft. Belvoir, Virginia: Defense Technical Information Center, 2004), 53–
57. 
30 J. C. Feuring, The Impact of Human Capital on the Cost of Air Force Acquisition Programs (Fort 
Belvoir, Virginia: Defense Technical Information Center, 2007). 
31 T. Jayachandran, An Analytical Cost Estimation Procedure (Ft. Belvoir, Virginia: Defense 
Technical Information Center, 1999). 
32 Ibid., IV. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In order to apply the Cobb-Douglas production function to economic analysis of 
the Ukrainian Armed Forces and for recommendations in regards to improving the 
defense planning process, we need to choose a timeframe. For qualitative country or 
branch of economy regression analysis it is necessary to consider at least 15 to 20 years. 
This timeframe is equal to the whole existence of the Ukrainian Armed Forces since my 
country gained independence in 1991.  
The next step is to identify what exactly we can include in “labor” and what in 
“capital.” It will not be easy because the Ukrainian Armed Forces change their program 
structure from year to year. Actually, the PPBS was established in 2005. When we 
determine at a high level what portion will be assigned to “capital” and how much to 
“labor” (α and β respectively) we will go to the next phase of defense planning.  
The MoD of Ukraine, like other ministries, has to compete for resources while the 
possibility of substantially increasing funding is extremely low. Hence, the challenge is to 
maximize the efficiency of funds allocated annually. It can be done in several stages: 
first, find the optimal division of funds by functional appropriations; second, maximize 
the measures of effectiveness (MOE) using a fixed budget approach; and, finally, apply 
the best solution in case of changes in the budget. In other words, during the process of 
defense planning it is important to apply what Hitch and McKean proposed in 1967. They 
advocate determining the maximum effectiveness for a given budget and then examining 
how each alternative fares under several different budget scenarios.33 
A quick look at the data shown in Table 1 and Figure 1 gives us an idea that 




                                                 
33 C. Hitch & R. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1967), 167, 176.  










Figure 2.  Total European Spending by Defense Spending Categories 
The best solution would be to increase defense spending at least 100%, but we 
know that this is practically impossible. It is not merely an issue that too low of a 
percentage of GDP is spent on defense. It is also an issue of determining how to increase 
expenditure for equipment and infrastructure more effectively and to make training more 
intense.  
In short, the Ukrainian Armed Forces should reallocate resources as shown in 
Figure 3 in the direction of Figure 4 or Figure 5 to meet the NATO or European example. 
This recommendation does not contradict the Non-Bloc status of Ukraine; rather it 
suggests how to improve the defense planning process and make it more scientific. It is 
proposed as a transitional plan to optimize the Armed Forces and to make it affordable 














































Figure 5.  Defense Spending Categories, Europe, 2011. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY  
The thesis is organized as a qualitative study. This approach was selected due to 
the lack of data for the entire period of observation that we currently have access to at 
NPS. In addition, before we make any calculations, we need to put forward clear 
requirements for the regression model and, theoretically, to justify what we need to 
include as “labor” and “capital” in the concept. 
In addition to the introduction and conclusion, this thesis includes three separate 
chapters. Chapter II describes how the Ukrainian Armed Forces organize the short-term 
defense planning and budget planning procedure. Chapter III examines long-term 
planning. It discusses state-level planning, instruments and approaches, and as a 
consequence, the need to shift from conscription to professional armed forces. Chapter IV 
contains recommendations on how to improve working with defense budgets and 
resource allocation; it also gives suggestions and imposes requirements for analysis of the 
conditions and factors that affect the planning of defense expenditures using the Cobb-








THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 21 
II. SHORT-TERM DEFENSE PLANNING AND BUDGET 
PLANNING AT THE MOD TODAY 
One of the main objectives of the MoD is to provide rational distribution and 
efficient use of scarce public resources to the Armed Forces. These objectives are defined 
in the laws and conceptual guidelines that regulate the activity of the MoD on defense 
and budget planning. 
As of today, the integration of defense and budget planning into a single effective 
system in the MoD has not been completed. The evolution of the defense budget process 
in Ukraine between 1991 and2006 was in the spotlight of Mileshko’s research.35 Since 
2006 we have felt significant changes in this area of MoD activity. A large number of 
laws, regulations, and guidelines was adopted, including the “Law On Domestic and 
Foreign Policy,” the National Security Strategy, and the Military Doctrine.36,37,38 
The result of the short-term defense planning is the budget request, the 
consolidated budget of the MoD, and the Plan of Maintenance and Development of 
Armed Forces (PMD). These processes cannot take place in isolation from the procedures 
adopted in the state as a whole. 
In Ukraine, organization of the budget process started almost from the first years 
of independence. At the same time, the adoption of the Ukrainian Defense Planning law 
in 2004 can be considered the start of defense planning.39 The law is the reason why 
defense planning was required to adapt to the current system of budget planning.  
                                                 
35 R. Mileshko, “The Evolution of the Defense Budget Process in Ukraine, 1991–2006” (2006), 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2818.  
36 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Law of July 1, 2010, № 2411-VI On Domestic and Foreign Policy, 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2411–17. 
37 President of Ukraine, Decree of June 8, 2012, № 389/2012, 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/771/2012.   
38 President of Ukraine, Decree of June 8, 2012, № 390/2012, 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/390/2012. 
39 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Law of November 18, 2004, № 2198-IV, On Defense Planning, 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2198–15. 
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In addition, during the implementation of the defense planning system in the MoD 
and GS, the programming stage of the defense and budget planning process was 
improved; it is adopted and widely used in the armed forces of many developed 
countries. The main advantage of this method of planning is that the organizational 
framework and resources for implementation of targeted programs fully meet the 
requirements of a market economy. In essence, defense planning and program-based 
budgeting method are complementary and designed to improve the efficiency of planning 
and the use of budgetary funds. 
Through repeated adjustments, iterations, and different calculations of data on the 
current state and the future outline of the Armed Forces we were able to determine the 
critical limit of expenditures necessary to meet the Armed Forces requirements on every 
defense program. At first, working groups performed this task; then, since 2007, it was 
the responsibility of the Budget Committee of the MoD. The implementation of the short-
term defense planning mechanism has allowed for getting the support of authorities at all 
stages of the budget process. 
In the next section the short-term defense planning procedure employed at the 
MoD is discussed. The budgetary planning of the MoD will be covered in the remainder 
of this chapter. 
A. THE MOD SHORT-TERM DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS 
Defense planning at the MoD and within the Armed Forces is carried out 
according to the Ukrainian Defense Planning law.40 To enforce the provisions of the law, 
mechanism and methodology of funding for strategic and defense planning were 
developed according to the relevant Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers (CMU).41 At 
the ministerial level an order of the Defense Minister of Ukraine was issued, which 
approved the regulations on the organization and implementation of intermediate and 
                                                 
40 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Law of November 18, 2004, № 2198-IV, On Defense Planning, 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2198–15. 
41 Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Decree of April 5, 2006, № 447b, On Approval of the 
Organization and Financing of Strategic Planning in the Defense and Military Development, 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/447–2006-%D0%BF. 
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short-term defense planning by the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine.42 
The procedure for the short-term planning is cyclical and is tied to the budget 
process in Ukraine. The cycle of the short-term planning can be divided into four stages 
(Appendix): 
• Phase I (November−March) consists of determining the next year’s preliminary 
expenditures on the MoD from the State Budget of Ukraine, making expenditure 
forecasts for the following years, and making changes to the list of budget programs. 
• Phase II (April−July) consists of developing Tentative Plan of Maintenance and 
Development of Armed Forces (TPMD). 
• PMD of Armed Forces, drafting the MoD budget request, and submitting that 
requestto the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine (MF). 
• Phase III (August−November) consists of supporting the Ukraine’s State Budget bill 
and drafting the PMD of the Armed Forces for the next year. 
• Phase IV (December−February) consists of obtaining approval of the consolidated 
budget of the MoD and the PMD of Armed Forces. 
1. Objectives and Outcomes of Phase I 
In the first phase the measures to be carried out during the planning period are set 
out; they are divided based on priority and the need for financial resources for their 
implementation as determined. Thus, a necessary database is prepared that will allow the 
management of the Armed Forces to decide on the amount of capital needs and priorities. 
At this stage, the Command of the Armed Forces and other military bodies 
responsible for the development and implementation of PMD provide general proposals 
to MDDMP on priorities and needs for financial resources. These proposals are made on 
the basis of the intermediate-term defense planning documents. 
The proposals received are analyzed and refined in MDDMP, according to the 
senior authority solutions of the MoD, the GS and according to possible limitations 
during that period. Referrals are submitted for consideration to the Budget Commission 
                                                 
42 Minister of Defense of Ukraine, January 19, 2010, Order № 15, On Approval of the Regulation on 
the Organization and Implementation of Medium-and Short-Term Defense Planning in the Ministry of 
Defense of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine (as amended on 28.12.2011 № 838), 
http://www.mil.gov.ua/. 
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of the MoD. The Budget Commission determines the preliminary draft budget for the 
MoD for the next year and makes expenditures forecasts for the following years in the 
fields of PMD and MoD budget programs. 
At this stage in budget planning, the preceding parameters of the draft budget and 
forecast spending for the next few years are being developed using the aforementioned 
indicators. The Minister of Defense signs this document and submits it to the MF. (The 
MF determines the terms and presentation annually.) 
2. Objectives and Outcomes of Phase II 
In the second phase the Tentative PMD is developed. Based on the TPMD, the 
MoD budget request is created and sent to the MF. At this stage the military authorities 
clarify what funds will be needed in the next year for the implementation of prioritized 
activities. They submit their resulting proposal to those responsible for shaping and 
implementing the development directions for the Tentative PMD draft. 
The proposals are analyzed and the feasibility of their implementation during the 
planned period is determined. By the middle of March aggregate proposals are submitted 
to the MDDMP to shape the Tentative PMD draft. Based on these proposals, MDDMP 
develops the Tentative PMD, and by the end of May it is submitted for approval to the 
Chief of the General Staff – the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.  
The approved Tentative PMD is sent to the MoD Department of Finance (DF) and 
to the Chief of Financial and Economic Management of the GS in full. Other organs of 
military administration receive specific excerpts from the document, such as those related 
to the formation of the MoD budget request. The procedure of forming the MoD budget 
request is contained in the next section. 
3. Objectives and Outcomes of Phase III 
The purpose of the third phase is to provide the MoD and the Armed Forces 
leadership with necessary materials (such as calculations, justifications, and other 
reference data) to justify the proposals to include expenditure needs of the Armed Forces 
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in accordance with the current law and to clarify the measures according to the specified 
expenditures by the CMU. 
At this stage the conciliation meeting takes place at the MF. Unresolved questions 
about the Armed Forces spending are submitted for consideration during the meeting of 
the National Security Council of Ukraine. If necessary, the proposals of the Minister of 
Defense and the Chief of the GS – Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 
on the increase in funding or decrease of the tasks assigned to the Armed Forces are made 
to the CMU, National Security Council, and the President.  
The DF promptly informs MoD management and the GS on the status of the MoD 
budget request that had been sent to the MF and the CMU. 
After the State Budget is approved by the CMU, the MoD Budget Commission 
examines materials on MoD cost sharing for budget subprograms (at the beginning of 
October). The Budget Committee’s decision, approved by the Minister of Defense, is 
then forwarded to the appropriate military command and serves as the basis for further 
refinement of the Tentative PMD measures and the formation of the PMD.  
By the end of October, those responsible for the formulation and implementation 
of the development strategy submit aggregate proposals for the PMD draft to the 
MDDMP. 
By mid-November the PMD draft is processed according to the established 
procedures. The agreed upon PMD draft is then sent to the DF of the MoD and to the 
Main Financial-Economical Directorate of the GS in full. The other organs of military 
administration receive only the portions of the draft related to the preparation of project 
proposals for the consolidated MoD budget.  
At this stage, defense planning and financial authorities work together to prepare 
reference and analytical materials, as well as the MoD speeches regarding the next year’s 
expenditures in the CMU and committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. 
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4. Objectives and Outcomes of Phase IV 
During the fourth phase of the short-term defense planning procedure the PMD 
combined estimate is adopted. 
The purpose of this phase is to bring a list of measures to be carried out in the 
plan period in line with the level of funding approved by the State Budget law. In other 
words, this phase prepares the ground for successful implementation of these measures. 
At this point the budget planning is ahead of the defense planning, which essentially 
contradicts the efficiency of planning activities. At this stage of budget planning the 
consolidated budget and passports of MoD budget programs are approved and serve as 
the basis for the final adjustment of the PMD draft.  
The final adjustment of the PMD draft begins at this stage. Planned activities in 
the PMD project are brought in line with the overall performance of the consolidated 
MoD budget. In the event that the total PMD cost exceeds these figures (in the process of 
refinement), as it usually happens, there are two possible solutions: first, searching for 
possible ways to increase the MoD budget; second, adjusting the PMD to reduce the 
number of measures or their value to meet the established boundaries of existing budget. 
The latter solution requires analysis of events and finding alternatives to save money. 
Bringing PMD project activities in line with the consolidated MoD budget is 
conducted on the following schedule: 
• within two weeks after the approval of the consolidated MoD budget, those 
responsible for the development and implementation of the revised PMD submit their 
revised PMD proposals to the MDDMP;  
• within one month after the approval of the consolidated MoD budget, the PMD which 
has been finally adjusted and based on the passports of budget programs is submitted 
for approval by the Minister of Defense. 
PMD funding begins with the start of the budget period. In case of late adoption 
of Ukraine’s state budget law funding for short-term planning is carried out in accordance 
with the Budget Code of Ukraine and other normative acts. 
Changes to the PMD, as well as review and approval of plans and other 
documents concerning defense planning, are based on orders and directives of the MoD. 
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Thus, the annual PMD contains a detailed list of measures within the allocated financial 
resources for the fiscal year. 
Implementation of the defense planning system in the Armed Forces of Ukraine 
was a transitional stage of planning from the “funds - measures - result of the use of 
funds” system to the “measures - money - the result of the activities and use of funds” 
system. However, this system needs to be supplemented with elements such as “goals” 
(at the beginning of the planning process) and “degree of the goals achievement” (at the 
end of the process). 
In addition, the defense planning system allows for possible costs related to the 
needs of the Armed Forces to be divided into three categories: personnel, training, and 
equipment and infrastructure. However, to make such a classification using the budget 
classification is very difficult. While budget planning is moving toward consolidation 
programs, defense planning reflects a trend to further specification. For example, in 2012 
we had seven budgetary programs (including the one that consists of 20 subprograms 
from all three areas: maintenance, training, and weapons and equipment), while the 
defense planning was operating in eight directions or 46 tasks. 
Deeper specification of defense planning allows us to more accurately classify 
expenditures for maintenance, training, and weapons and equipment. Furthermore, it 
allows us to transform these expenditure areas into budget programs (subprograms) 
according to generally accepted approaches in the state. This trend also allows us to 
provide necessary specifications for the preparation of reference materials and reports. 
B. THE MOD BUDGET PLANNING PROCESS 
As in the short-term defense planning process, there are four stages in the budget 
planning process of the MoD: 
• Phase I (January − middle of April) consists of the formation of the prior indicators of 
the State Budget of Ukraine; 
• Phase II (June−July) consists of the formation of the MoD budget request; 
• Phase III (August−November) consists of support of the bill “On the State Budget of 
Ukraine”; 
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• Phase IV (December−January) consists of the formation of a consolidated budget of 
the MoD and the passports of budgetary programs. 
1. Objectives and Outcomes of Phase I 
Based on prior indicators determined by the Budget Commission in terms of MoD 
budget expenditures, those responsible for the development and implementation of state 
programs (and subprograms) send justification for changes in the structure of next year’s 
expenditures to the DF in agreement with the MDDMP. If necessary, during this phase 
they also provide suggestions for changes to the list of names and quantity of budget 
programs. 
Proposals of the prior indicators of draft budget for the next year and for the 
forecast of expenditures for the following years in terms of spending MoD are approved 
by the Minister of Defense and are submitted to the MF. (MF determines the terms and 
form of presentation annually.) 
2. Objectives and Outcomes of Phase II 
During the second phase, the MoD budget request is formed (on the basis of the 
Tentative PMD) and is sent to the MF. 
After the MF approves the limits of the State Budget general fund for the next 
year, the MoD Budget Committee examines the distribution of these costs across budget 
programs (including their related subprograms). Those responsible for the development 
and implementation of state programs defend these indicators before the budget 
committee. As a result of the budget committee hearing proposals to clarify the 
distribution of threshold expenditures across budget programs for general and special 
funds of the MoD budget request and of additional budget requests (over the limits) are 
prepared. These proposals can be submitted for consideration and approval by the 
Minister of Defense. 
Based on the approved distribution thresholds spending, those responsible for the 
development and implementation of the state programs work on proposals for the MoD 
budget request and provide them to the DF. The DF summarizes received proposals, 
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prepares an MoD budget request, and submits it to the Minister of Defense to be signed 
and sent to the MF within a stipulated period. 
3. Objectives and Outcomes of Phase III 
During the third phase (August−November) the state budget law is supported. 
This phase coincides in full (including all content and activities) with the third stage of 
the short-term defense planning, as outlined in earlier in this chapter. 
4. Objectives and Outcomes of Phase IV 
During the fourth phase the consolidated budget and passports of budget 
programs of the MoD are approved. These documents, as described in the previous 
section, are based on the PMD draft. However, the approved combined MoD estimate is a 
basis for the final adjustment of the PMD. 
After the CMU approves the draft budget for the next year, DF, in cooperation 
with those responsible for the development and implementation of budget programs 
(including their related subprograms), start drafting the budgets of lower level 
administrators. They allocate expenditures and send (in October) their estimates to these 
managers for compiling; they consider spending performance estimates of lower level 
units and send proposals for the MoD consolidated budget draft (in November). 
Based on MF approval of the limits on budgetary allocations, the DF refines and 
submits the combined estimate of the MoD and the proposals to the annual and monthly 
allocations of the Ukrainian State Budget for approval by the Minister of Defense. 
In the two weeks after the publication of the Ukrainian State Budget Law, the DF, 
in the prescribed manner, submits the refined Defense proposals to the basic indicators of 
the state defense order to the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine. 
One month from the date the state budget law is signed, on the basis of the 
approved consolidated MoD budget, the passports of budget programs are approved by 
the joint order of the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Finance. 
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The combined MoD estimate, as well as extracts from the annual and monthly 
schedules of appropriations of the State Budget of Ukraine, are approved by the Minister 
of Defense and then sent by the DF to the GS in its entirety. Relevant parts of the 
combined MoD estimate are also distributed to those responsible for the formation and 
implementation of budget programs. 
Thus, during the budget planning at the MoD, defense planning documents are 
widely used at all stages. This transparency allows those responsible for the formation 
and implementation of budget programs to better determine what the spending needs of 
the Armed Forces are, to allocate financial resources more efficiently, and to carry out 
directions for use, and so on. 
Although there are many benefits to planning the MoD budget request, practical 
experience has shown that there are certain problems in the mechanisms of the short-term 
defense planning process: 
• Annual projected defense spending figures were significantly lower than envisioned 
in the Strategic Defense Bulletin and the State Programme of the Development of the 
Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006−2011;43 
• No mechanism exists for separating expenditure needs indicators of the Armed 
Forces from the total expenditure on defense. Analysis of predictive indicators for 
spending on defense shows the trend of its annual reduction, while GDP grows every 
year; 
• The limit of MoD expenditures for the fiscal year is identified by the MF at the 
beginning of the budget process and is usually equal to the current year expenditures 
multiplied by the inflation index. Sometimes these expenditures do not include even 
the minimum requirements of the Armed Forces; 
• Due to the fact that the expenditures limit for the needs of the Armed Forces is not 
known before the fiscal year, the GS is forced to develop the PMD draft several 
times. 
                                                 
43 President of Ukraine, Decree of December 22, 2004, № 670/2004, On the Decision of the National 
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of 17.06.2004 “On the Strategic Defense Bulletin of Ukraine for 
2015,” http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/670/2004 . 
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C. CHANGES NEEDED IN THE DEFENSE PLANNING SYSTEM AND 
BUDGETING 
The analysis of the organization and implementation of the short-term defense 
planning in the MoD and the Armed Forces showed that during the period of 2005 to 
2011 a substantial improvement took place. It was demonstrated from the development to 
the practical implementation of the legal framework in the process of defense planning. 
However, there are unresolved problems in the defense and budget planning process at 
almost every phase. These problems do not allow us to qualitatively determine the need 
for funds and to ensure their effective use. In particular, at this time there is an urgent 
need to increase the effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency of the planning system. 
The implementation of the target-oriented method of defense planning shifts the focus 
from the management of budget resources to the management of processes to achieve 
specified goals or at least to meet specified performance indicators. 
The conceptual apparatus defined in the legal framework has the same 
requirements. Thus, the Budget Code of Ukraine stipulates the following terms: 
• a budget program is a set of measures aimed at achieving the common goal, 
objectives and expected results; each spending unit is responsible for defining and 
implementing those goals and objectives according to their functions; 
• a passport of the budget program is a document that defines the purpose, objectives, 
areas of budget funds responsible for planning, performance indicators, and other 
characteristics of the budget program, according to the budget appropriation 
established by the State Budget of Ukraine; 
• budget management is a set of actions of the budget process participants in 
accordance with its powers relating to the formation and use of budgetary funds; it 
enforces budget legislation aimed at achieving the goals, objectives, and concrete 
results of their activities and ensures efficient, effective, and targeted use of budgetary 
funds.44 
As we can see, the law stipulates that all measures of the budget process should be 
aimed at defining and “achieving goals, objectives, and concrete results.” The same 
definitions regarding budget management are given in the Law of Ukraine “On Defense 
Planning:” 
                                                 
44 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Budget Code of Ukraine of July 8, 2010, № 2456-VI, 
http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2456–17/print1366176374220905.   
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Defense planning is an integral part of the strategic planning and 
management of state resources in the field of defense, which is carried out 
in the statutory deadlines in order to ensure the required level of defense 
capabilities through grounding prospects of the Armed Forces and other 
military formations with regard to the nature of real and potential threats 
in the sphere of military and economic capabilities of the state, with 
specific activities, agents, and deadlines.45 
The Budget Code of Ukraine in this case is a legislative act of general application. 
The use of the terminology of the Law “On Defense Planning” is consistent with the 
provisions of the Budget Code of Ukraine; moreover, it specifies regulation concerning 
the Budget Code. As a general rule, then, it should apply the provisions of the Law. In 
addition, the Constitution of Ukraine defines the Armed Forces tasks as the “[d]efense of 
Ukraine, protection of its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability.”46 
Thus, the main objective of the Armed Forces can be considered to be the ability 
to perform tasks defined by the Constitution of Ukraine. This goal is extensive and 
comprehensive. Therefore, to ensure a smooth planning process it is necessary to define 
intermediate objectives through the achievement of which the main goal can be achieved. 
To achieve these goals, we must identify specific tasks and activities. Thus, we have 
employ a three-fold approach to achieve the main goal: (1) identify the goal, (2) specify 
the intermediate objectives, and (3) determine the tasks and activities required to achieve 
these objectives. According to the defense planning process, the effectiveness of these 
measures is impacted by the timing of their implementation.  
At this time, the defense and budget planning in the MoD and Armed Forces is 
carried out only at the third level, which includes the measures to be carried out by those 
responsible for the development strategy and budget programs. (There are detailed 
criteria of these measures in the PMD and grouped indexes in the passports of the budget 
programs.) 
                                                 
45 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Law of November 18, 2004, № 2198-IV, On Defense Planning, 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2198–15. 
46 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Constitution Act of June 28, 1996, № 254k/96-VR, 
http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80. 
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The goals in the documents on defense and budget planning are not clearly 
defined. If we define a goal as a task in defense planning documents (as stated in the 
order of the Minister of Defense) and budget planning (as described in the passport of the 
MoD budget program), the goals are only described declaratively (“as a provision…,” 
“carrying out…,” “restoration…,” etc.), without defining specific indicators. 
The quantitative and cost indicators of the PMD and performance indicators of 
MoD budget programs also cannot be called objective, since such factors may be 
considered only measures to achieve goals. According to the results of their 
implementation, it will be impossible to determine to what extent the Armed Forces 
increased/decreased its ability to carry out constitutional tasks. These indicators would 
provide a way to measure its effectiveness in case of the full provision of the Armed 
Forces’ needs. 
In addition, existing documents do not currently define the timing of planned 
activities. In other words, these activities are deemed to be performed within a year. This 
lack of specificity makes monitoring the timeliness of the planned activities, assessing the 
use of budget funds, and adjusting the performance of individual commanders on these 
issues impossible. 
Also, despite the fact that initial planning is done based on well-known practices 
(that is, the activities are the primary source in determining the expenditure items), the 
MoD budget request is formed based on the Tentative PMD. The draft of the 
consolidated MoD budget is formed on the basis of the PMD draft. The completion of the 
process, however, is the opposite: approved expenditure items determine the ability to 
perform activities. Practice has shown that during the final adjustment of the PMD draft 
certain measures have been changed or canceled at the last moment due to the 
discrepancy of the expenditure items and the content of these measures. 
There are drawbacks in the stage of implementation of programs and plans in the 
MoD and the armed forces. In addition to objective factors, the quality of planning is 
adversely affected by a number of subjective factors: 
• inconsistency of management decisions with regard to the planning documents; 
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• dispersion of efforts of military management on current problems with disregard for 
the impact of those decisions on the future; 
• attempts to preserve the old system of resource allocations; 
• tendency to identify planning activities without defining specific outcomes, etc. 
All this leads to the dispersion of limited budget funds to the activities that are not 
covered by the plans and are contrary to the fundamental principle of defense planning, 
which determines the specific priorities of the Armed Forces according to specific needs. 
At the implementation stage of short-term planning significant efforts are 
primarily focused on the execution of the budget. Thus, bodies of military management at 
all levels are dealing with the control of the financial flow mechanism and forgetting that 
the main goal is achieving specific outcomes. The military budget documents (including 
passports of budget programs, estimates, monthly apportionment plans, monthly 
distributions of allocations, etc.) are formed solely on the basis of budget categories and 
do not provide accessibility and transparency in the allocation of resources. This situation 
does not allow the respective heads of military management bodies to respond to the 
failure of short-term plans and to influence this process. 
Along with other factors during budget execution, it leads to problems associated 
with unsustainable use of resources. On the one hand, all possible resources are sought to 
solve ongoing problems; on the other hand, the funds are not used in time because of 
delays in agreements, bureaucratic obstacles, and problems with tender procedures. 
While the presence of unused funds is considered only a financial bodies problem, the 
reason for that is often a late execution of work or services, the implementation of which 
should be controlled by those commanders. 
Lack of transparency of financial resource allocation and a permanent 
requirement to use the resources immediately encourages officials to use them 
inefficiently. In addition, some executives underestimate the importance of the PMD and 
try to implement measures that are not scheduled, which further erodes the whole system 
of defense planning and does not allow for the achievement of specified performance 
plans of the armed forces. 
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Some problems exist at the reporting stage. A system of ongoing monitoring 
(such as measurement of effectiveness) of budget programs performance, as well as 
defense programs must be established. This system will allow management to make 
appropriate decisions promptly. 
Currently, taking into consideration the reporting of the budgetary programs, it is 
possible to perform the cash flow analysis, as well as to examine the dynamics and 
structure of MoD expenditures. PMD performance reporting only allows us to see the 
trends and to do a superficial analysis of program implementation and usage of resources. 
However, at this time it is difficult to determine the effectiveness of measures and usage 
of resources from defense and budget reporting, since, as noted earlier, the terms of their 
implementation and their ultimate goals are not clearly defined at the beginning of the 
planning process.  
All these aspects confirm that the planning process requires improvement. The 
defense planning system should be united by а common concept to achieve defined goals 
in accordance with certain financial resources. 
D. CONCLUSION 
One of the main tasks of defense planning is rational distribution and efficient use 
of scarce public resources for the Armed Forces’ needs. The system of short-term defense 
planning established in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is performed cyclically, and it is 
consistent with the national budget process. Defense planning documents have been 
widely used at all stages of budget planning in the MoD, which allows for the 
determination of the military’s expenditure needs more reasonably and to make the 
process of financial resources allocation more efficient. 
However, at this time there are unresolved problems at almost all stages of the 
short-term defense planning process. The quality of the planning process and efficiency 
of budget funds usage need to be improved. Modern approaches suggest shifting focus 
from budget resource management to controlling the process of achieving a goal, i.e., 
specific performance objectives. These approaches should be implemented in the Armed 
Forces of Ukraine along with clearly defined goals and an action plan to achieve them.  
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The main points of improving the expenditure planning process should be: (1) the 
use of budget management, including balancing expenditures according to available 
financial resources and the challenges posed to the Armed Forces of Ukraine; (2) 
developing mechanisms of long-term strategic planning and taking into account 
indicators of strategic planning in the intermediate and short term; (3) combining the 
defense and budget planning in the MoD by integrating the defense and budget programs 
and synchronizing processes. 
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III. STATE-LEVEL PLANNING AND THE PROFESSIONAL 
SOLDIER: IMPERATIVE OF OUR TIME 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the short-term defense planning was 
generally well organized in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The approaches to the planning 
process that are used in the Ukraine in general take into account the experience of the 
leading countries in the defense planning organization and mechanisms of its 
implementation. However, development of basic military and political documents is part 
of strategic and long-term defense planning. 
In this chapter I will discuss the key documents that affected, or could affect, both 
the funding of the armed forces and their development. I am also going to justify the need 
for further professionalization of personnel as the most rational option from the points of 
view of resource allocation and monitoring of the entire military organization. 
A. LONG-TERM PLANNING: DOCUMENTS AND APPROACHES 
The main documents of long-term planning are the Strategic Defense Bulletins 
(SDB) of Ukraine 2004 and 2012.47,48 According to Ukrainian legislation, “financing of 
the Armed Forces of Ukraine is carried out by State Budget of Ukraine.”49 The financial 
indicators of the first SDB formed the basis of the State Programme for the Development 
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the period of 2006–2011. On the basis of the 
decree approved by the president last year, a program is currently being developed that 
will continue until 2017.  
It should be noted that the first projected indicators of defense expenditures for 
2015 from the general fund of the state budget were made during defense planning and 
                                                 
47 President of Ukraine, Decree of June 22, 2004, № 670/2004, On the Decision of the National 
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on June 17, 2004 “On the Strategic Defense Bulletin of Ukraine 
for 2015,” http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/670/2004.  
48 President of Ukraine, Decree of December 29, .2012, № 771/2012, On the decision of the National 
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of 29 December 2012 “On the Strategic Defense Bulletin of 
Ukraine,” http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/771/2012 
49 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Law of December 6, 1991, № 1932-XII, On Defense of Ukraine, 
article 2, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1932–12.   
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were accepted by the Government of Ukraine in February 2004. The financing of the 
MoD is expected to be on average at 2% of the GDP and defense needs identified at the 
level of 2.09% of the GDP. These indicators of expenditures were taken as a basis for the 
development of the Strategic Defense Bulletin of Ukraine for 2015, which is a conceptual 
long-term policy document on the reform and development of the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine. Due to an understated inflation rate over the planning of defense spending (from 
6.2 to 9.7 %, while in reality it was 13% and higher) we faced chronic underfunding of 
the MoD.50 As a result, prices have increased 2.5 times, but according to unofficial expert 
estimates, that figure was much higher. Moreover, with the change of government in 
2007, indicators of expenditures were reversed and funding of the MoD was shifted to the 
“manual” mode. 
The previous program failed primarily because of underfunding. The president 
tried to remedy the situation by issuing the decrees of 2008 and 2009, but the documents 
did not find support from the CMU.51,52 One of the consequences of this policy was the 
fall of the financing needs of defense under 1 % of the GDP (in 2009–2011), while at the 
time of the SDR adoption the Article 2 of the National defense law included the norm 
that defense spending must be at least 3% of the GDP. Later, in 2007 the law of Ukraine, 
“On State Budget of Ukraine for 2008” removed the norm “3% of GDP” for defense 
spending.53 However, despite the fact that the constitutional court declared the 
amendment unconstitutional, it has not returned to the applicable law.54 
                                                 
50 State Statistics Service of Ukraine, Consumer Prices for Goods and Services in 2002–2012, 
http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2008/ct/cn_rik/icsR/iscR_u/isc_tp_rik_u.htm.  
51 President of Ukraine, Decree of January 10, 2009, № of 2/2009, On the Decision of the National 
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of 26 September 2008 “On Urgent Measures to Raise the Defense 
of Ukraine,” http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2/2009. 
52 President of Ukraine, Decree of March 3, 2008, № 196/2008 On Immediate Measures to Ensure the 
Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/196/2008 . 
53 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, The Law of Ukraine, On State Budget of Ukraine for 2008 and 
Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine, article 74, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/107–
17/print1364237936225598.  
54 Constitutional Court, Decision of May 22, 2008, № 10-rp/2008, “The decision of the Constitutional 
Court of Ukraine in the case of the constitutional petition the Supreme Court of Ukraine on...,” 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v010p710–08  
 39 
Moreover, even the money that was allocated for the defense budget did not reach 
the MoD because of the division of this amount for the general and special fund. During 
the execution of the State Programme for the Development of the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine during the period of 2006–2011, the share of the special fund that the MoD did 
not get ranged between 30–60%. In addition, in 2006, Article 88 of the law “On the State 
Budget of Ukraine for 2006” applied a mechanism that was allowed to restrict funding 
even for a general fund.55 Financing practices of the armed forces from any other funds 
different than a general fund lead to the fact that the MoD will not be funded in full, even 
though funding is included in the state budget. 
The approaches to financing mentioned above are important because in the recent 
past Ukraine has completed the development of the Concept of Reform and Development 
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the period up to 2017.56 Currently, an intermediate-
term program is being developed by the MoD on the basis of the concept. Financial 
resources for its implementation are determined by the decree of CMU.57  
  
                                                 
55 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Law of December 20, 2005, № 3235-IV On the State Budget of 
Ukraine for 2006, article 88, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3235–15/print1364237936225598.  
56 President of Ukraine, Decree of December 29, 2012, № 772/2012, On Decision of the National 
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of 29 December 2012 “On the Concept of Reform and 
Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the period till 2017,” 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/772/2012. 
57 Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Decree of July 7, 2010, № 568, On Approval of Forecast 





Year The amount of expenditures, million UAH Total Includes the needs of the defense 
2011 11239 10475.8 
2012 13299.5 12396.4 
2013 15360 14317 
2014 17358 16179.4 
2015 19418.5 18100 
2016 21416.5 19962.4 
2017 23477 21883 
2018 25475 23745.4 
2019 27535.5 25666 
2020 29533.5 27528.4 
2021 31594 29449 
2022 33592 31311.4 
2023 35652.5 33232 
Table 3.   Prognostic Indicators of Expenditures from the General Fund Budget for 
Defense Until 2023. 
Unfortunately, the term “% of GDP” is excluded from this decree entirely, 
making it difficult to trace the development of the national economy and the level of 
financing of one of its most important institutions. On the other hand, the level of funding 
claimed in the decree even at first glance does not meet those ambitious goals that have 
been stated in the Strategic Defense Bulletin of Ukraine. Thus, the results of a defense 
review without adequate financial support are more declarative than economically 
justified or legally binding. It is even more important that any changes made to the 
previous medium-term program on financial indicators of the MoD failed. 
It should also be noted that from the beginning of the defense review in July 2008 
to its completion in December 2012, it took almost 3.5 years, and the financial indicators 
for its implementation were approved in July 2010.58 Such long-term planning shows the 
complexity rather than quality of setting priorities. During the same period Ukraine 
                                                 
58 President of Ukraine, Decree of June 27, 2008, № 598/2008, On the Decision of the National 
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of 30 May 2008 “On a defense review,” 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/598/2008.  
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refused to join NATO, declaring non-aligned status, which, however, did not lead to 
increased funding.  
Reform is not a set of organizational and staff measures to reduce the armed 
forces but the construction of a new system of relations in different directions: between 
the army and society and between the army and the state economy. It is also about 
development of relations within the army. The logic is hard to find. According to the 
SDR, the full switch to the contract service is planned to happen by 2025. According to 
the president it will be by 2017, while according to the minister of defense “military 
service drafting will end in 2013, and at the same time the transition to manning of the 
army exclusively under contract will start.”59 “The transition to a contract will happen 
during this and next years, after which Ukraine will have a professional, adequately 
staffed army.”60 It is not only a different time frame (under the state program the 
transition would take until 2015) but also a different dimension and understanding of the 
depth of the professionalization process.61 In this case, given the amount of funding 
defense needs for the period up to 2023, there was an urgent need to review the date of 
completion of the transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to a professional army. As a 
result, the MoD thought it was reasonable to conclude the transition to all-voluntary 
service by 2025, to be carried out in three phases: 2011–2015 (80% of the manning 
level), 2016–2020 (90% of the manning level), and 2021–2025 (100% of the manning 
level).62 
The 2012 Strategic Defense Bulletin claims it is systematic and serves as a basis 
for the preparation of policy documents (reform and development programs). The main 
provisions of the bulletin are the strategy of transforming the military organization of the 
                                                 
59 Interfax, “Yanukovych: Ukraine Soon to Have Professional Army,” February 15, 2013, 
http://www.interfax.co.uk/ukraine-news/yanukovych-ukraine-soon-to-have-professional-army/.  
60 Bondarchuk Mykola, “Minister of Defence: ‘We do not want to fight anyone, but we will stand up 
for ourselves if need be,’” UNIAN, February 11, 2013, http://www.unian.ua/news/552627-ministr-oboroni-
mi-ne-zbiraemosya-ni-z-kim-voyuvati-ale-skrivditi-sebe-ne-damo.html. 
61 President of Ukraine, Decree of April 17, 2002, № 348/2002, On the State Programme of Armed 
Forces of Ukraine Transition to Manning, Performing Military Service Under the Contract, 
http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/348/2002. 
62 Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, The Main Provisions of the Military Reform in Ukraine, 
http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?part=reforms&lang=ru&sub=opvrvu  
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state, the rational allocation of tasks of defense, a prospective structure, development 
priorities, and the initial data for the medium-term planning. However, the CMU has 
failed to demonstrate an overall view of the security sector reform by not answering these 
questions: (1) what are the goals of the reform? (2) what is the future of the security 
sector and each of its components? (3) what are the relationships between various 
programs? Worth mentioning is the institutional dimension of this issue. For example, 
disaster management by the armed forces was not mentioned in the SDB at all while the 
State Emergency Service of Ukraine became a part of the MoD just two weeks after the 
SDB was published.63 
Another example of this is in 2012 the new Highly Mobile Assault Troops were 
created based on airborne and airmobile units.64 At the same time we cannot find any 
references about it in the SDB in that year. Finally, the long-term plans involve 
improvement of the troops’ (forces’) organizational structure, reorganization of 
establishments, and optimizations of its strength. This means the automation of processes 
management, which in fact cannot take into account the specifics yet. Thus, millions of 
UAH will be used ineffectively; this is not an isolated case. This proves that the priorities 
of development must be chosen more thoroughly.  
Meanwhile, the transformation of military structures of governance to further 
strengthen civilian control over the armed forces, the withdrawal of their non-core 
functions of policy formulation and implementation outsourcing are seen as a secondary 
or long-term tasks. So, we should find a way to create an effective system to protect 
national interests and use it to build an efficient and adequate model of the Ukrainian 
security sector and its components. The key momentum here has to be further 
professionalization of the armed forces. 
                                                 
63 President of Ukraine, Decree of January 16, 2013, № 20/2013, Some Aspects of the State 
Emergencies Service of Ukraine, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/20/2013.  
64 Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, “The Armed Forces of Ukraine” (White Paper, 2012), 17, 
http://www.mil.gov.ua/files/white_book/WB_2012_ua.pdf . 
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B. THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER  
The last few decades have been characterized by the fall of authoritarian regimes 
and the formation of democratic institutions in many countries of the world. Samuel 
Huntington describes this process as the third wave of democratization that swept a large 
group of countries. He said that “democracy is the only legitimate and viable alternative 
to an authoritarian regime of any kind.”65 Naturally, changes have occurred in the army 
as well because it is a mandatory institution of the state. 
There is no unity among political scientists on the definition of the term 
“democratization” or “professionalism.” However, practice is the criterion of truth, and 
the best way to understand theoretical postulates. Ukraine gained its independence in 
1991. As part of the Soviet Union we had forced conscription, while in independent 
Ukraine we have had more democracy and are moving toward professionalization of 
various law enforcement agencies, security forces, and armed forces.  
Eliot Cohen said the United States failed to establish a reliable system of military 
service. He reviewed numerous approaches including selective service, an all-volunteer 
force, lottery draft, universal military service and universal military training.66 Below are 
the achievements and contemporary problems in Ukraine, and an analysis of different 
approaches to the issue of such prominent theorists like Huntington and Morris Janowitz 
in more depth. 
1. Ukrainian Vision of a Professional Soldier 
In the Soviet Union it was an honor to serve in the conscription army. At the same 
time, the threat of a military coup was neutralized by a number of measures. There were 
periodic executions of army commanders, especially in the period between the First and 
Second World War; a strong institution of commissars, which was a shadow of the 
commanders; and powerful and pervasive ideological work. Independence provided an 
                                                 
65 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1993). 
66 Eliot A. Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1985), 117–133, 166–189. 
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opportunity for a new look but more importantly, allowed us to put the forms and 
methods suitable for the beginning of the twenty-first century into practice. Due to a 
number of objective and subjective reasons, the speed of the transition was different, and 
so was the result. 
Ukrainian border guards are national successors of the Soviet Border Troops. The 
personnel of the State Border Service of Ukraine consist of military personnel and 
employees of the State Border Service of Ukraine. It is the most proactive agency in 
comparison with other defense and law enforcement structures, and it evolved from a 
military structure to a law enforcement (police-type) body. The Border Troops of Ukraine 
have completely switched to a contract service. 
Such steps towards professionalization and, even more, demilitarization are being 
taken by the Security Service of Ukraine. “SBU considers that it is normal practice when 
the state body functions within the civil structure. We are also ready to consider a 
prospect of transition to the civil structure,” the deputy head of the Security Service of the 
Ukraine Porodko said.67 At the same time, he stressed that it will not occur fast but will 
be gradual due to the dismissal of a large number of people from the military service and 
a significant fiscal burden associated with it. 
It is likely that the issue of funding was crucial in the case of armed forces, too. 
First of all, this is determined by the number of personnel, and, therefore, money 
allowances for its maintenance, as well as by reasons of political expediency. The first 
full-fledged attempt to go to professional armed forces was made after the defense review 
in 2004.68 This program has not been implemented, although it was subsequently stated 
at all levels that there is no alternative to professionalization. Another attempt was made 
this year, and the minister of defense proclaimed 2013 as the last year in which young 
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people would be called for service.69 Starting next year, the armed forces will be formed 
only on a contract basis. “Ukraine needs [an] efficient army, despite the fact that there are 
no contentious issues with the neighboring states,” said Deputy Defense Minister 
Oliynyk, in a press-conference.70 On the other hand, Rahmanin proves that under the 
circumstances a military coup in the Ukraine is impossible.71 So, what do the classics tell 
us? What do they think is the criterion of professionalism and what are their views on the 
control of the military organization? 
2. What is a Professional? 
Huntington and Janowitz both create connections between the civil and military 
worlds based on professional affiliation; however, their approaches differ significantly. 
Despite the fact that Huntington was not quite satisfied later with his first work in 1957, 
his opponents cited this paper as a classic work on the relationship between military and 
civilian institutions. Before delving into the details, it makes sense to briefly touch on the 
term “professionalism.”  
In Ukrainian interpretation a “professional” is a person who is well educated, 
whose relationship with an organization is defined by a contract, and who brings his 
experience and knowledge to the position. Perhaps in this lies the duration of the 
transition process to the all-voluntary and professional force. The reason for that is not 
only underfunding (which of course makes it difficult to implement defense programs), 
but also the lack of understanding of the essence of professionalism. At the same time, 
according to Max Weber, to be a professional means a “vocation” or dedication of life 
wholly and exclusively to politics. He wrote, “He who strives to make politics a 
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permanent source of income lives ‘off’ politics as a vocation, whereas he who does not 
do this lives ‘for’ politics.”72 
By pursuing quantity of contract servicemen, we are missing the qualitative aspect 
of their training. As a result, we are seeing a large turnover when only a few of them sign 
a second contract. In this case, the old Soviet system, with an officer being career military 
makes more sense in the Weberian understanding of the word “professional” than the one 
that exists now in Ukraine. What is obvious to Western analysts is not fully 
comprehended in my country yet. In other words, it is impossible to form a professional 
military corps by parliamentary bill or presidential decree.  
3. Even More Control is Required of Professionals  
Based on an appropriate understanding of the “professionalism,” Huntington 
proposed a system making it possible to establish a balance between the competence of 
the military and political supremacy of civilians. He defined this system as the concept of 
“objective control.”73 Huntington recommended that civilian leaders provide 
considerable autonomy to professional military in the tactical and operational area in 
exchange for their full and unconditional subordination to civilian control in matters of 
policy and strategy of nation building. Although this system is not always confirmed by 
practice, the American idea on how civil authorities have to oversee the military was 
being formed for more than fifty years. If it is not infringed, it leads to the overall balance 
of relations between civilians and the military, and as a result to reasonable policy 
decisions. 
Objective control can be considered as a reliable tool against the politicization of 
the armed forces. Professional soldiers are moving up the hierarchical ladder due to the 
improvement of their professional skills. Because of this, they want to maximize the 
isolation of professional activities from outside influences, especially from politics. In the 
                                                 
72 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. Gerth and 
Mills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77–83. 
73 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap/Harvard, 1957), 83. 
 47 
case of army politicization, instead of focusing on the improvement of military skills it 
will drown in the political debate. 
According to Huntington, military intervention into politics is the antithesis of the 
objective control: civilian control is reduced to the extent that it increases the 
participation of the army in the institutional, class, and constitutional politics. The 
subjective control, by contrast, involves intervention. The essence of objective civilian 
control presupposes recognition of the autonomy of military professionalism. The 
essence of subjective civilian control is to deny the independence of the military sphere. 
Subjective civilian control achieves its objectives by imposing civic values to a military, 
turning the army into a reflection of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its 
objectives through the militarization of the army, turning it into an instrument of the 
state.74  Objective civilian control is achieved by reducing the influence of the army in 
society. The army becomes neutral to all participants in the political struggle. 
However, objective control provides for recognition in the military sphere entirely 
left for military professionals (e.g., combat training, mastering the skills to use different 
types of weapons, etc.). Thus, the political activities of civil society groups in the armed 
forces are minimized and they take control, while the definition of the size of the armed 
forces, the level of funding, including the taking of risks on the definition of external 
threats are taken on by the politicians. Provided there is objective control over the armed 
forces, Huntington brings a civilian element of control to the border, which does not 
allow the military to determine the order of their use in the framework of the 
constitutional purpose.  
Yet, the question of who is fully responsible for financing the armed forces 
remains. Is it those politicians in the Ministry of Finance who are focused on money or 
the National Security Council? Politicians who are focused on money, or the ones who 
are attentive to security issues? In my opinion, it should be the last one because, 
according to Tilly, .”..war-making depends on three closely-related factors: the character 
of its major rivals, the external threat interests of its domain classes, and the logic of the 
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protective activity…”75 In the Informal Agency Theory, Feaver said, “the civilian 
principal contracts with the military agent to develop the ability to use force in defense of 
the civilian’s interests” and “only the principal knows exactly how he judges various 
risks and how these judgments translate into preferences over outcomes.”76 Definitely, 
money is important, but understanding the challenges and threats, and taking an 
integrated approach and systematic evaluation is inherent only in National Security 
Council, whose decisions must be binding on the Ministry of Finance. 
4. Scholars’ Discussion on Army Professionalization Issue 
Nevertheless, the military must do their job well, and that means to possess the 
“distinguishing characteristics of a profession as a special type of vocation:” expertise, 
responsibility, and corporatism.77 Huntington not only raised the issues of military coups 
in principle, but he pointed out the solutions, offering an appropriate theoretical 
apparatus. Almost everyone, including his students, would criticize him later, but 
Huntington gave a reference point and suggested a method. He said, “Method should be 
used to solve real world problems, not just serve as instruments for cloistered debates in 
academia.”78 It is even more important in post-nuclear age.  
Talking about professionalism, Cohen analyzes and provides historical examples 
of a wide range of possibilities, including professional force, a cadre/conscript system, 
and a militia arrangement. He proposes a combination, involving relatively small but 
high-quality professional army for local wars with support of mass army if needed. He 
argues that the resultant force would be the best compromise between a military necessity 
and a political outlook. So, one of his possible solutions at that period of time was: “First, 
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service should be brief and limited; second, forces should be ready for both total and 
small wars (assumed volunteers); third, the system must not be excessively costly.”79 
Yet much is changing currently. When the fighting becomes more technologically 
complex, military operations are transferred to the computer networks, and as a result, 
require a high level of training of the personnel. In practice, it is difficult to prepare such 
a specialist in a matter of a few months and it is even more costly and not wise at all to 
send this individual to the reserve soon. An all-volunteer and professional force is the call 
of the times and the objective reality. For example, compare the time it took to catch 
Osama bin Laden and the time it took to catch Boston terrorists Tsarnaevs by Special 
Forces. New complex technology, social networks, news media, and people who can 
manage all these resources resulted in having the job done in a matter of days.  
Discussion about professionalism will not be complete if we do not study the 
sociological approach by Janowitz. Using interdisciplinary methodology, Janowitz (as 
well as Huntington) foresaw the future of the armed forces in the hereinafter 
professionalism but used an opposite approach. Whereas Huntington prescribed a 
division of labor that would respect both military professionalism and objective civilian 
control, Janowitz rejected objective control. He advocated a theory, which encouraged 
active interconnectedness between civil society and the military in order to foster civic 
participation. It narrows the gap between the civilian and military spheres, makes the 
structure of the armed forces more bureaucratic and requires deep specialization.80 At the 
same time, there is no institutional autonomy (Huntington), but there is pervasive 
integration (Janowitz). 
For example, the outsourcing of military supplies, catering, and the convergence 
of military and civilian education systems (similar to the ROTC), is now implemented in 
Ukraine, but these processes are not of a systemic nature. If there is government funding, 
then purchased services are meant for the protection of bases and depots; the military is 
not fully satisfied with the civilian logistics of food services; the leadership over military 
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education passed from Army, Navy and Air Force to the MoD and back many times, and 
the system of education 4+1 (4 years as a student + 1 year as a cadet) is still questionable.  
C. CONCLUSION  
As opposed to short-term planning, long-term planning requires more attention, 
even though a number of concepts and programs have been adopted recently. It is 
necessary to develop a clear structure of the contemporary security and defense sector, to 
define the role and place of the armed forces in it, and to identify the national procedures 
of the defense and budget planning and their relationship to the economy of the state. 
Unfortunately, the SDR has not answered any of these questions.  
The procedure and method of forming forecasting indicators of expenditures on 
defense are situational in nature. Revision and modernization of resourcing and 
legislative and regulatory support of the planned reforms will require a balanced 
approach and political will not only from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, but also 
from the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and the 
President. Professionalization should be state business. 
Laws should govern the determination of the total number of the Armed Forces 
personnel and their optimization through their financial and economic support. 
Professionalization of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is still understood narrowly in the 
SDR; it is reduced to a mechanical increase in the number of contract servicemen and 
some financial motivation; no attention is paid to the depth, meaning, and the systematic 
nature of this issue. Often it comes down to a volunteer force, which is not always 
equivalent to a professional one. 
“Civil military problematique” is still a hot topic.81 Furthermore, professionalism 
is imperative of our time; it is our future. Today it is impossible to be successful in any 
field without doing a top quality job. This is fully applicable to the Ukraine as well. A 
professional is, first of all, a well-trained soldier. Observing the trend of gradual 
reduction in defense spending by the state, it makes no sense to hope for a miracle, but to 
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look for internal resources within the Armed Forces. One of the solutions to the problem 
could be reducing the number of troops while redistributing resources to the training of 
personnel and the purchase of new and upgraded weapons. Moreover, merely stating 
“there is no alternative” is not acceptable. A comprehensive analysis should be conducted 
and informed choices need to be made. This method can serve as a regression analysis 
and an application of the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED DEFENSE 
PLANNING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Profound qualitative changes are rapidly taking place in theory and practice of the 
art of war. This, in turn, means there is a need for a radical improvement of resource and 
especially financial provision of the Armed Forces of the Ukraine. Unfortunately, 
financial forecast indicators leave us with low expectations regarding the availability of 
those provisions in the near future. 
Moreover, the correlation between a military organization’s needs and the state’s 
capabilities has been a problem that has not been solved either methodically or 
mathematically in a form of algorithm aggregate. For example, every year the first phase 
of defense planning starts with the usual question, “What indicators should be applied in 
the short-term planning process?” In practice, the problem can only have an empirical 
solution and will depend mainly on the economic conditions in the country as well as the 
political situation and not on a thorough analysis. 
The resources’ provisioning system is due for revision as well. The system should 
be based on modern methods of production, distribution, and use of resources for the 
effective and economical use of taxpayers’ money and for better control over the 
resources’ use on the part of the armed forces and civil society. 
A. IMPROVING DEFENSE PLANNING 
Many authors of published works all over the world try to justify the amount of 
military spending based on its impact on the economy. Usually they do this by using 
complex mathematical and statistical models; however, a consensus on the general 
direction of the influence of military spending on economic growth has not been reached. 
Some view military spending as an alternative investment to the civil sector and argue 
that military expenditures negatively impact economic growth. Others do not see a stable 
relationship between military spending and economic growth rates. In general, everyone 
agrees that there is a certain optimum value in military spending, and those values are 
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different in different countries. Therefore, Ukraine cannot remain on the sidelines of the 
global processes and must contribute to the rational use of resources. 
At the same time, computational models and methodologies for assessing the 
impact of military spending on the armed forces themselves simply do not exist. Year 
after year, we state (especially during the period of 2006–2011), that the MoD failed to 
fully meet the resource requirements of the armed forces; “expenditure was mainly 
focused on supporting personnel and making urgent steps to restore the technical 
readiness of military materiel and armaments.”82 Patching the holes or prioritizing 
everything is not a development plan; and it is not even planning. 
It seemed that the situation would change significantly with the adoption of the 
2006–2011 medium-term program and the transition to program- and goal-oriented 
planning, but it never happened. Underfunding is only part of the problem, although the 
former minister sees that as the entire problem.83 Equally important are issues of 
forecasting the cost indicators of planned activities, as they are the source data for the 
determination of costs. Inventory objectives themselves have been long overdue for 
revision (some have not been changed since Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union). 
Despite progress in matters of pricing, the regulatory and methodological framework 
needs significant improvement. 
The effectiveness of PPBS in many ways depends on the indicators and criteria 
that are established during the development of plans and programs, and which are used to 
evaluate their subsequent implementation. Unfortunately, in many cases they do not 
objectively reflect reality; often they are of a specific nature and may be difficult to 
determine. Even now, at the stage of the development of reforms that should take place 
by 2017 it is becoming clear that their implementation is virtually impossible due to the 
discrepancy between the goals and the financial resources needed for meeting them. This 
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necessitates development of the order and methods of determining the defense 
expenditure indicators and creating a mechanism to make amendments. 
Although we have categorized the long-, medium-, and short-term planning 
processes, there is still no continuity between them. They do not constitute a hierarchical 
system and do not give an adequate idea of the effectiveness of the performed activities. 
It might be possible to track the activities, but making adjustments to the medium-term 
program is impossible as was mentioned in the second and third chapters. Without proper 
provision, the long-term program of action outlined in the SDR remains a mere intent and 
words instead of becoming an achievable goal. 
1. Develop a Unified Approach 
In order to create a unified development planning system for the armed forces that 
would have achieving specific goals as its objective, there needs to be a unified approach 
to the defense and budget planning at the MoD and the GS to ensure the effective use of 
budget funds. Thus, MoD budget planning must focus on achieving the objectives set in 
the defense plans. Budget programs need to aim at supporting the plans developed in the 
course of defense planning with the utmost efficiency, precision, and transparency. 
For the last few years, the MoD has been working on reducing the number of 
budget programs. To some extent, this process has provided a great deal of flexibility in 
terms of transferring funds from one budget program to another; however, improvements 
are still needed. So, there needs to be a correspondence between budget programs and 
defense programs in terms of the expenditures on personnel and their training and the 
purchase of weapons. This approach will ensure greater transparency of the planning 
process, and its clarity will ease the process of program monitoring and control. 
Unfortunately, the fact that MoD financing is below 1% of GDP shows that it is 
necessary to determine the minimum needs level of the armed forces. The needs should 
be based on the “protected budget expenditures.”84 Other criteria should be subject to the 
requirements of combat readiness. Politicians can reduce the level of funding for the 
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armed forces within the framework of civilian control over the military organization, but 
they must be aware of the risks involved and take on full responsibility in this case. 
In case of a more favorable level of MoD funding it makes sense to prepare 
several versions of the budget request. This is necessary both for internal use (within the 
MoD, for a better evaluation of the use of budget money alternatives), and to defend the 
budget request before the CMU, NSDC and VR. Additional influx is possible from the 
revision of the general fund budget for the first and second quarters, as well as from a 
special fund. It is advisable to secure the multi-variant approach in the documents 
governing the short-term planning. The Budget Committee should be entrusted with 
choosing the best alternative in the course of the hearing on the budget request. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Fixed-Budget Approach. 
Methodologically the following approach is proposed.85 Within every year’s 
specific budget B* (in our case, it is a constant for taking inflation into account) we 
should analyze different alternatives A1, A2, A3 (Figure 6). Every alternative A1 includes 
expenditures for personnel, training, equipment, and infrastructure. It will be ideal if we 
have different sets of alternatives (and find the best A1) for different (more difficult) and 
same (a simple case) level of financing of the B. It means that everyone who is 
responsible for a budget proposal (subprogram) should give information to the Resource 
                                                 



























Planning Directorate on a different level: pessimistic, optimal and optimistic. Finally, on 
the General Staff and MoD levels we have to use the economic evaluation of alternatives 
to find the best solution based on the submitted budget proposal for the whole MoD to the 
MF. In short, we have to maximize the overall effectiveness of the MoD. 
In his research paper, “The Economic Evaluation of Alternatives,” Dr. Melese 
recommends achieving a significant defense acquisition reform in the following ways: by 
integrating Requirements Generation and Defense Acquisition with the PPBS, reducing 
future costs, and improving performance and schedules.86 The key concept of his study is 
that alternatives are cost-effectiveness relations, not points.87 For example, in the case of 
the optimistic budget B* the best alternative is A1, and in case of reduction or sequester of 
budget (pessimistic B**), the best alternative will be A2. So, we can see in Figure 7 how 
this approach provides a unique opportunity for senior leadership to achieve significant 









Figure 7.  Expansion Path Approach. 
Intuitively we have used this approach with different levels of budget at the MoD 
(eligible/affordable or optimistic/pessimistic), represented in Figure 7, but we did not 
develop enough elements of the cost-effectiveness system. To solve this problem, we 
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should first answer several questions: what is important, how much is enough, how 
important is it, and finally, how much does it cost?  
It is very important to link economic (particularly financial) indicators with the 
efficiency of their use. This implies, first of all, the formation of the whole system of 
measurable indicators, when we can conclude whether the goal is achieved and by what 
percentage upon completion of the planning cycle. To do this, there should be at least 
five to 10 criteria in each MoD program. 
2. Develop an Objectives Hierarchy: “Top-Down” Approach 
Our goal is to maximize the overall effectiveness of the MoD, and determining an 
objectives hierarchy would be the first step on this path. We already know what the top 
level is: personnel, training, equipment, and infrastructure. Now a more difficult task: 
using the “top-down” approach in which we proceed downward to lower levels of 
increasing detail. We have to develop every category (build the “tree”) until it can be 
measured and stop when we know how to quantify things. It can be accomplished in 
different ways: numerical (weight), cognitive load (low/medium/high), or categorical 
(yes/no) measures. 
Then we have to establish a value function and stop when we can measure every 
category (answering the question: how much is enough?). After that we develop a set of 
weights, comparing different attributes over their respective range to answer to the 
question: how important is it? 
And finally we will find the MOE: 
 (1) 
At the end we can find the best one using solution techniques (“superior,” 
“efficient,” “marginal” or “optimal” solution). With Dr. Francois Melese’s approach we 
will end up with possibly a couple of them (for different levels of budget).88 
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Of course, the MoD has previously used characteristics, features, attributes, and 
other criteria in the defense planning process, but it is time to do it more systematically. 
After that we need feedback on at least a quarterly basis to know how things go. When 
accomplished, it will be a powerful tool for proving the need to assess the effectiveness at 
both stages: when we develop proposals for submission and when the final decision will 
be made. It is very important to provide a powerful tool for senior management to make 
decisions quickly and wisely, in order to minimize the risks of future uncertainty. 
Improving defense planning will allow stakeholders to clearly define objectives 
and the activities needed to achieve them. This would increase the validity of resource 
requirements at all stages of the budget planning and efficient use of funds. 
B. USING THE COBB-DOUGLAS PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
The armed forces must be prepared not for yesterday’s wars, but for the current 
ones or possible future ones. With radical changes in the nature of armed conflict, 
military reform must be radical too. Science is the only place to find answers to all 
questions concerning the evolving nature of armed conflicts and to provide sound 
recommendations on specific areas of development of the armed forces. First of all 
scientific analysis considers the types, forms, and methods of their application, the 
structure and the size of the military, the development prospects and quality indicators of 
arms and military equipment, and the direction and training of troops (forces) intensity. 
A solution to this complex problem is only possible within the comprehensive 
framework of professional armed forces. To construct this framework, as we know from 
experience with the previous medium-term program, it is necessary not only to develop 
and document the program of transition to the contract form of service, but also to link it 
to training programs as well as to a long-term program of arms acquisition and 
modernization of the armed forces. These and other documents should clearly define the 
roles and tasks of the armed forces, taking into account their operational use. 
Effective planning is impossible without the development of new approaches and 
methods. It is evident from the experience of implementing PPBS in Ukraine since 2004, 
from the implementation of the medium-term program and from the annual planning 
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cycles, that it is necessary to consider all possible risk factors, transition to stochastic 
models, and to develop methods of situational, indicative and strategic management. 
There is a considerable body of literature that examines the impact of the amount of the 
budget expenditure allocated for defense on the economic growth of the state as a whole. 
In this analysis, I would like to narrow the field of research, namely to consider the 
efficient allocation of resources within the MoD. One such option is the Cobb-Douglas 
production function offered as an approach for better resource allocation in the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces. The resulting work can be referred to as: “Modeling and optimizing 
resource allocation of the Armed Forces to stimulate the economic efficiency under fixed 
budgets.” 
1. Research Questions 
To develop the resource allocation model using the Cobb-Douglas production 
function, the following questions were considered: 
• Does the structure of defense expenditure matter? If so, what are the signs and 
direction of the correlation between “labor” and “capital” and the efficiency of 
defense spending? 
• How can the transition to staffing the Armed Forces of Ukraine exclusively with 
contract service personnel be improved? 
2. Assumptions and Theoretical Background 
As a rule, except the obviously impracticable special fund, the amount of 
spending on the defense of Ukraine within the same fiscal year is constant and 
determined by the state budget. It is assumed that by varying the structure of costs of this 
magnitude, one can achieve maximum return for each hryvnia invested. The common 
MoD financing tool is the budget programs, but from the point of view of this study it 
will be more convenient for us to use aggregates. 
Labor: By increasing personnel expenses we can improve the quality of the 
personnel through additional education, field training, and coaching. More intensive 
training enhances professionalism, promotes stability, creates human capital, and 
provides infrastructure. On the whole it may contribute to improving the educational 
level of the labor force in the country and may act as a stabilizing influence in society. 
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Higher pay reduces turnover and increases the competitiveness of military service in the 
labor market. 
Capital: While personnel costs in recent years were about 80%, the rearmament 
and modernization expenditures were based on a residual principle. At the same time, 
investment in the defense sector generates innovative development. In this case, you can 
do with fewer troops, to prevent loss of life in the event of a conflict, to form positive 
externalities for the civilian sector through the revival of the domestic military-industrial 
complex. 
Rapid growth of the share of “Subsistence of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” (from 
68.7% to 86.8%), and reduced funding of “Investment in infrastructure, weapons and 
equipment” (from 21.5% to 9%) observed in the period from 2006–2011, indicates the 
lack of a deliberate government policy and a crowding out effect. These actions were 
motivated by the need to keep the number of members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, 
which, in our opinion, has nothing to do with the efficient use of state resources. Thus, 
over the years, investments in innovations, high-end technology, and procurement of new 
weapons became unavailable. 
Consequently, there is every reason to believe that the failure of the previous 
medium-term program is due not only to its underfunding, but also its ineffective 
implementation. Military spending is not regulated by market processes; therefore, it 
tends to distort optimal allocation of resources. A policy implemented to support a 
military program was probably detrimental to efficient resource allocation. In order to 
prevent a recurrence of the above-mentioned practices for the medium-term program up 
to 2017 it is necessary to thoroughly examine the issue. 
3. Methodology 
The study presented in the following sections is an empirical analysis of the 
relationship between appropriations for “labor” and “capital” within the MoD budget and 
its impact on the efficiency of defense spending. The intent is to determine how to 
achieve a relationship between “labor” and “capital” to get the most efficient use of the 
budget under one budget cycle. The method is to study the effect of these ratios on a set 
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of predefined indicators of their effectiveness (both qualitative and quantitative). Such a 
model for the analysis of the armed forces funding has never been applied before. It 
allows for simulation of the macro-processes at the level of a single ministry. 
4. Data 
The initial data is the amount of money from the state budget spent on the 
categories of “labor” and “capital.” Here it should be noted that the current MoD 
breakdown does not fully comply with this requirement. So, at the moment, the budget is 
broken into the following categories: “Subsistence of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” 
“Training of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” and “Investment in infrastructure, weapons 
and equipment.” However, some time ago, “the Reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” 
was a separate category. Moreover, even the allocation of a particular subprogram to a 
category can vary within the budget or defense planning process (e.g., modernization of 
materiel). 
The best solution in this situation is linking defense and budget program 
expenditures based on the “transformer” and bringing the resulting data in its final form 
to meet the standard in NATO countries (see Table 4). In addition, the methodology 
developed in the course of this study must be used within the framework of the 
“Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process” and, in particular, for the 
development and implementation of the “Annual National Program of Ukraine-NATO 
Cooperation.” Such an approach is not contrary to the non-aligned status of the state and 
at the same time assists in developing capabilities for both NATO-led and EU-led 
operations. 
The indicator system proposed in the previous section will allow for assessing the 
effectiveness of each program separately. At the same time, even on the basis of a set of 
criteria that is now available, it is possible to draw conclusions about the success of the 
MoD in general. These include, for example, indicators of preparation (the number of 
graduates, average flight time per crew, tactical exercises, parachute jumps, combat 
firing), technical equipment (a number of new and modernized military equipment were 
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brought into service), and social standards (salaries for service personnel and wages for 
civilian personnel, cost of food, clothing, etc.). 
Code Category 1991 (…) 2017 
  1  OPERATING COSTS       
  1.1    Military personnel       
  1.1.1      Pay and allowances       
  1.1.2      Employer’s contributions to retirement funds       
  1.1.3      Other       
  1.2    Civilian personnel       
  1.2.1      Pay and allowances       
  1.2.2      Employer’s contributions to retirement funds       
  1.3    Pensions       
  1.3.1      Paid to military retirees       
  1.3.2      Paid to civilian retirees       
  1.4    Operations and maintenance       
  1.4.1      Ammunition and explosives (excluding nuclear)       
  1.4.2      Petroleum products       
  1.4.3      Spare parts       
  1.4.4      Other equipment and supplies       
  1.4.5      Rents       
  1.4.6      Other operations and maintenance       
  2  PROCUREMENT AND CONSTRUCTION       
  2.1    Major equipment       
  2.1.1      Missile systems (a)       
  2.1.2      Missiles (conventional weapons)       
  2.1.3      Nuclear weapons       
  2.1.4      Aircraft       
  2.1.5      Artillery       
  2.1.6      Combat vehicles       
  2.1.7      Engineering equipment       
  2.1.8      Weapons and small arms       
  2.1.9      Transport vehicles       
  2.1.10      Ships and harbor craft       
  2.1.11      Electronic and communications equipment       
  2.2    National military construction       
  3  RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT       
  3.1    Devoted to major equipment       
  3.2    Other       
  4  OTHER EXPENDITURES       
  5  TOTAL (1 + 2 + 3 + 4)       
  6  STATISTICAL DISCREPANCY       
  7  ADJUSTED TOTAL (5 + 6)       
Table 4.   Actual and Planned Defense Expenditures by Service and Category. 
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To conduct a quality regression analysis it is advisable to take the data for the 
entire period of Ukraine’s independence. Data for this model should be a time frame for 
the 22 year period from 1991–2013. 
5. Variables 
The analysis includes the aggregate variables “labor” (which roughly translates to 
Operating Costs in the NATO classification) and “capital” (Procurement and 
Construction + Research and Development, respectively). This neutral approach will help 
avoid ambiguous interpretation of the terms within the country. In addition, it will help 
compare Ukrainian statistical samples with the control samples, namely those of the 
NATO states. We can draw a line at the old Member States, with the greatest period of 
observation, as well as those that are most similar to Ukraine in territory and the number 
of troops (Poland, Romania, Turkey). 
Such efficacy studies have not been conducted in Ukraine, especially since the 
current categories “Subsistence of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” “Training of the 
Armed Forces of Ukraine,” and “Investment in infrastructure, weapons and equipment” 
are not clearly defined. On the other hand, developing the system of performance 
indicators of each defense budget program will significantly improve the quality of 
planning with a focus on the end result. 
6. Model Specifications 
For our model, we used the following specifications: 
a. Define performance indicators for each of the defense programs. 
b. Group financing indicators into two categories “labor” and “capital.” To do 
this, a clear correspondence must be established between the financial performance of 
defense programs and budget programs by forming a “transformer” matrix. Next, 
adjustments should be made in attributing expenditures to the appropriate category 
according to the national guidelines. In general, they reflect the defense expenditure (also 
called defense burden). 
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c. Study the correlation of structural shifts in the distribution of resources using 
performance indicators (as defined in Step a.), and aggregate indicators of “labor” and 
“capital” (defined in Step b.). 
d. Establish the correlation and functional relationship between the growth rate of 
aggregate indicators for “labor” and “capital” and selected factors in accordance with the 
requirements of econometric analysis. 
e. Determine, as a result of the selection of statistically significant interactions, an 
econometric model that includes the isolated effect of each factor. The regression 
coefficients will show the change of the “labor” and “capital” percentage rate in the event 
of a change of selected factors by 1%, ceteris paribus. 
f. Evaluate the functional relationship between the growth in defense spending 
and the corresponding “labor” and “capital” changes based on the neoclassical theoretical 
approach and using the Cobb-Douglas production function.. If each of them is changed 
by 1%, the elasticity of these factors will show how it will impact the volume of military 
spending as a whole.  
g. Analyze the obtained isoquants (the ratio between K and L) within the fiscal 
year Q (Figure 8). Next, the cost-benefit analysis must be used to move from point C1 or 
C2 to the optimal point C`. Similarly, having made calculations for each year, we get a 





















Figure 8.  Adjustment from Inefficient to an Efficient Input Mix. 
h. Analyze the results of the implemented econometric model to determine the 
most efficient use of resources and to make an informed prioritization of what processes 
need to be given attention on the government level. 
7. Expected Results 
The results of the study should be taken with caution, considering that many 
controversial events took place within the history of Ukraine and its Armed Forces since 
the declaration of independence. First, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine 
inherited a huge part of the Armed Forces: about 780 thousand members of personnel, 6.5 
thousand tanks, about 7 thousand armored combat vehicles, up to 1.5 thousand military 
aircraft, ships and more than 350 support ships, 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 
1,272 strategic nuclear warheads and 2.5 thousand tactical nuclear weapons.89  Second, 
defense financing was not applied evenly. For example, in 1992 the defense of Ukraine 
was allocated 34% of the necessary funds, in 1993–1994 only 28%, in 1995 only 16.9%, 
and all this against the background of a significant reduction in numbers.90 Thirdly, it is 
necessary to take into account the macroeconomic situation in the country as a whole. For 
                                                 
89 O. Kuzmuk, “The Military Organization of Ukraine:  Laying the Foundation,” Science and 
Defense, (February 2012), 9, http://www.nio.mil.gov.ua/pdf/2012–1.pdf.  




















example, as a result of the 2008 economic crisis the armed forces’ needs were satisfied at 
the level of 1% of GDP or less during 2008–2011. 
At the same time, as a result of the study, it is expected to reach correspondence 
between “labor” and “capital” as well as output indicators. The correlation between these 
categories can be interpreted in the context of sources of funding, namely the expenditure 
structure. The prevalence of this or that category should be linked to historical context; it 
should be broken into periods if necessary and grouped according to the implementation 
of the medium-term program. It is advisable to eliminate the influence of factors such as 
periods of recession in the country and make the system exogenous. 
The resulting patterns should form the basis of medium-term program adjustments 
within annual defense planning. The results should serve as a theoretical basis for the 
professionalization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Proven methodology should be one 
of the components for the next defense review. 
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Going forward, the first step is to use the model provided in this thesis to conduct 
a study using a database from 2006 to 2011 as the most comprehensive medium-term 
program and relevant to the previous one. Next, it makes sense to cover the entire period 
of Ukraine’s independence from 1991 to present. In the future, this model could be 
updated with more recent data as it becomes available. In addition, the accumulated 
statistics will allow for the determination of the trend lines as well as prediction of future 
optimal allocation of resources between “labor” and “capital.” 
Another suggestion for future research would be to apply this analysis to specific 
levels of the military to determine whether similar effects occur on a smaller scale. In this 
regard, the experience of the Naval Forces as a leader in terms of transition to contract 
service is of particular interest. 
In the future using the Cobb-Douglas production function for resource allocation 
in the Armed Forces has to be a powerful analytical tool for determining the annual 
number of servicemen and their transition to the professional service as a whole. 
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Moreover, it will provide a basis for the transfer of areas not normally controlled by the 
military (security, logistics, housing) to the management of civil structures. It also seems 
promising to study the effect of personnel training quality on the overall efficiency of 
resource use. 
D. CONCLUSION  
Budget planning in the MoD should be carried out on the basis of defense 
planning documents at all stages. At the same time, the existing system of defense and 
budget planning at the MoD and the armed forces requires improvement. This will help 
clearly define the objectives and actions necessary to achieve them as well as improve the 
validity of resource requirements and efficient use of funds at all stages of the budget 
planning process. 
Without a well-developed system of performance indicators for each program 
(and related subprogram) it is impossible to evaluate the achievement of goals 
objectively. Such a system would not only establish an effective control of the defense 
and financial planning process, but also allow fortimely adjustments to the program. The 
presence of several well-reasoned alternative options, whether it is a standalone program 
or the MoD budget request as a whole, will improve the quality of planning and, as a 
consequence, will lead to a more efficient use of resources. 
The end result of defense planning in the Ukrainian Armed Forces should be 
rational management decisions for implementing the state policy in the military sphere of 
national security. The purpose of the proposed regression analysis is to identify the 
rational correlation between the expenditure on “labor” and “capital” and its impact on 
the efficient use of defense expenditure from the state budget. The proposed new 
approach of the Armed Forces resource analysis in terms of components such as “labor” 
and “capital” will bring a new perspective on their distribution, help optimize the number 





In this thesis all stages of the defense planning and budgeting processes were 
studied, weaknesses in the allocation of defense resources revealed, and the mechanism 
for their effective use proposed. 
A. SUMMARY OF WORK 
The aim was to analyze the defense and budget planning processes and to develop 
methodological approaches to the analysis and forecasting of defense resource allocation 
using the Cobb-Douglas econometric model. 
These goals were achieved by: 
• systematizing the factors that determine the functioning of the defense and budget 
planning within a short cycle; 
• estimating the effect of military spending on the implementation of the State 
Program of the Armed Forces’ Development from 2006–2011 and identification 
of the need for more thorough planning of the next medium-term program; 
• analyzing the system of defense expenditure planning at the state level and 
concluding that a move to fully professional armed forces is necessary; 
• defining the requirements for evaluating the structure of defense expenditures 
using the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
The focus of research is the defense planning process in the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine. The subject of the study is the macroeconomic factors affecting the efficient 
allocation of defense resources. 
The theory and methodology of the study were based on the principles of modern 
economic science, particularly classical, neoclassical, and Keynesian theory, research in 
the military and economic science field, as well as laws and regulations, and state 
government instructional and methodological documents. The work comprises the 
methods of the system, comparative, factor, and economic analysis. 
The scientific value of the work is in a critical analysis of the defense and budget 
planning state in the MoD and the armed forces and researching effective methods for 
their improvement. The most significant areas of difficulty in the medium-and long-term 
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planning are identified as well as the technique for the macroeconomic analysis and 
forecasting of resource support for the armed forces based on the Cobb-Douglas function 
is proposed. 
The practical significance of the work lies in the MoD leaders being able to use 
the findings and recommendations in the decision-making process on resource allocation 
in the short term as well as in the strategy formation of the Armed Forces development. 
Proposals will improve the process and defense budgeting in the MoD. 
B. STRUCTURE AND THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS 
The relevancy of the thesis topic, stating the purpose and main tasks, defining the 
subject and the object of research and providing scientific novelty and practical 
significance of the work as well as analyzing the literature on the topic is presented in the 
first chapter. 
The second chapter contains an analysis of the legal framework for defense and 
budget planning, focusing attention on the need to improve the quality of the justification 
for the need in resources at all stages of the budget planning and effective resource use in 
the Armed Forces of the Ukraine. 
Unlike short-term planning, medium and long-term planning are more declarative, 
as detailed in Chapter III. This stems from the lack of consistent government policy in the 
area of defense or unified views on its implementation (in particular on the number of 
personnel and the quality of its preparation), as well as the inadequate resource support of 
decisions and omissions in the calculation methodology. It is concluded that further 
professionalization of the military is necessary. 
The fourth chapter includes findings on the need to improve not only the list of 
defense and budget programs but also their quality and relationships. In particular, 
emphasis is placed on the need to develop a system of indicators for each program 
(subprogram) to make timely adjustments, as well as to obtain clear judgment about the 
extent of its implementation. Based on these findings, we propose the use of the Cobb-
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Douglas production function for rational decision-making in the management of defense 
resources. 
The conclusion contains the main findings and results of the study. 
C. THEORETICAL RESULTS  
Existing regulatory frameworks of the defense and budget planning processes at 
the MoD and the Armed Forces of Ukraine are coordinated in terms and activities and are 
aligned with the statewide requirements. At the same time, there are procedural gaps, 
causing a problem in determining the effectiveness of planning and the use of budget 
funds. 
It is necessary to improve the program-target method of budget planning while 
monitoring the results and achievement of the set goals. The goals should be realistic, 
achievable, and directly linked to the resources available. A well-established system of 
priorities and challenges that affect the combat capability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 
needs to be in place. 
Defense planning should precede and be a basis for budget planning in the Armed 
Forces of Ukraine. There is a need to shift emphasis from the management of budgetary 
resources to the management of the goal achievement processes or in the direction of 
obtaining specific indicators. 
There is a need at hand to develop new approaches to evaluating the effectiveness 
of budget expenditures by calculating the ratio between performance results and the cost 
of achieving them as well as the degree of achievement of planned operation results. 
The organizational structure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the development 
of weapons systems and military equipment at the present stage require the 
professionalization of the armed forces. What’s important is the quality of the personnel, 
and not the number of personnel. The shift in priorities will invariably cause changes in 
the size and structure of defense spending. Making an informed decision and having a 
number of alternatives will require a comprehensive feasibility study in addition to the 
analysis of threats and challenges. 
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Creating a unified methodology of planning a military organization development 
is not possible without quality modeling, including resource provision. One option in the 
toolbox of financial forecasting can be analysis of the defense spending structure using 
the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
The study certainly does not cover all issues of defense and budget planning at the 
MoD and the Ukrainian Armed Forces; however, it defines the key points on which it is 
advisable to focus further research and development. It is proposed to replace the 
extrapolation methods that are still occurring with a more flexible system of factor and 
economic analysis. In our opinion, an implemented statistical analysis of the defense 





Bodruk, A. Structures of Military Security: National and International Aspects. Kiev: 
NIPMB, 2001. 
Bondarchuk, Mykola “Minister of Defense: ‘We do not want to fight anyone, but we will 
stand up for ourselves if need be,’” UNIAN, February 11, 2013, 
http://www.unian.ua/news/552627-ministr-oboroni-mi-ne-zbiraemosya-ni-z-kim-
voyuvati-ale-skrivditi-sebe-ne-damo.html. 
Bruton, H. J. “Productivity Growth in Latin America.” The American Economic Review 
57, no. 5 (1967): 1099–1116. 
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Decree of April 5, 2006, № 447b, On Approval of the 
Organization and Financing of Strategic Planning in the Defense and Military 
Development, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/447–2006-%D0%BF. 
———. Decree of July 7, 2010, № 568, On Approval of Forecast Expenditures Figures 
from the General Fund Budget for Defense until 2023, 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/568–2010-%D0%BF. 
Chiabrishvili, M. “Economic Security Environment and Implementation of Planning 
Programming, Budgeting, Execution (PPBE) System in Georgia.” Master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. 
Cobb, C. and P. Douglas. “A Theory of Production.” American Economic Review 18, 
(1928): 139–165. 
Cohen, Eliot A. Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1985. 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine. Decision of May 22, 2008, № 10-rp/2008. The decision 
of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case of the constitutional petition the 
Supreme Court of Ukraine. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v010p710–08. 
“Defense Ministry Tells Why Ukraine Needs Efficient Army.” ForUm News, March 4, 
2013, http://en.for-ua.com/news/2013/03/04/170034.html. 
Douglas, P. H. “The Cobb-Douglas Production Function Once Again: Its History, Its 
Testing, and Some New Empirical Values.” Journal of Political Economy 84,  
no. 5 (January 1, 1976): 903–915. 
Feaver, Peter D. Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
 74 
Feaver, Peter D. “Civil-Military Relations.” Annual Review of Political Science 2, vol.2, 
no. 1 (1999): 211–241. 
Feaver, P. D., and Erika Seeler. “Before and After Huntington: The Methodological 
Maturing of Civil-Military Studies.” In American Civil-Military Relations: The 
Soldier and the State in a New Era, edited by Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. 
Snider, 72–90. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009. 
Feuring, J. C. The Impact of Human Capital on the Cost of Air Force Acquisition 
Programs. Fort Belvoir, Virginia: Defense Technical Information Center, 2007. 
Gerschenkron, A. “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective.” In The Political 
Economy Reader: Markets as Institutions, edited by N. Barma and S. Vogel, 222–
227. New York: Routledge, 2008. 
Hannon, P. “EBRD Cuts Forecasts For Russia, East Europe.” Wall Street Journal, May 
10, 2013. http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424127887323744604578474450778425048.html. 
Hitch, C. and R. McKean. The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967. 
Hofbauer, J., R. Levy, G. Sanders, G. Ben-Ari, D. Berteau. European Defense Trends 
2012: Budgets, Regulatory Frameworks, and the Industrial Base. Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 18, 2012. 
https://csis.org/files/attachments/121218_EuropeReport%202012_EventSlides.pdf 
Huntington, Samuel. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap/Harvard, 1957. 
———. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1993. 
Interfax International Information Group, Interfax-Ukraine. Bulletin, Kyiv, November 28, 
2012. http://www.interfax.co.uk/ukraine-news/cabinet-approves-2013-macro-
forecast-with-3–4-gdp-growth-4–8-inflation-3/. 
International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook: Hopes, Realities, Risks. (April 
2013), 65. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/pdf/c2.pdf. 
Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier. New York: Free Press, 1971. 
Jayachandran, T. An Analytical Cost Estimation Procedure. Ft. Belvoir, Virginia: 
Defense Technical Information Center, 1999. 
 75 
Krasnolutska, D. “Ukraine Rating Affirmed by S&P as Negative Outlook Kept,” 
Bloomberg, May 16, 2013. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013–05–
16/ukraine-rating-affirmed-by-s-p-as-negative-outlook-kept.html. 
Kuzmuk, O. “The Military Organization of Ukraine: Laying the Foundation.” Science 
and Defense, (February 2012): 7–14. http://www.nio.mil.gov.ua/pdf/2012–1.pdf.  
“Last Military Conscription to be Held This Fall, Defense Ministry Says,” ForUm News, 
March 4, 2013. http://en.for-ua.com/news/2013/03/04/164805.html. 
Melese, F. “The Economic Evaluation of Alternatives.” Report, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2010. 
Mileshko, R. “The Evolution of the Defense Budget Process in Ukraine, 1991–2006.” 
Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2818.  
Miller, E. An Assessment of CES and Cobb-Douglas Production Functions. Washington, 
D.C: Congressional Budget Office, 2008. 
Minister of Defense of Ukraine. January 19, 2010, Order № 15, On Approval of the 
Regulation on the Organization and Implementation of Medium-and Short-Term 
Defense Planning in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine (as amended on 28.12.2011 № 838). http://www.mil.gov.ua/. 
Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. “The Armed Forces of Ukraine.” White Paper, 2011. 
http://www.mil.gov.ua/files/white_book/WB_Eng_final_2011.pdf.  
———. “The Armed Forces of Ukraine.” White Paper, 2012.  
http://www.mil.gov.ua/files/white_book/WB_2012_ua.pdf. 
———. The Main Provisions of the Military Reform in Ukraine. 
http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?part=reforms&lang=ru&sub=opvrvu. 
Mozharovskyi, V. et al. The White Book 2011: Armed Forces of Ukraine. Kyiv: Ministry 
of Defense of Ukraine, 2012. 
NATO. “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defense. Defense 
Expenditures of NATO Countries (1990–2011),” Communiqué, 
PR/CP(2012)047-REV1, April 13, 2012. http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets 
/pdf/pdf_2012_04/20120413_PR_CP_2012_047_rev1.pdf. 
Nelson, R. R. “Aggregate Production Functions and Medium-Range Growth 
Projections.” The American Economic Review 54, no.5 (September 1, 1964): 575–
606. 
 76 
Nhemachena, C. R. “Defense Budgeting in a Constrained Economy: Reengineering the 
Budget Process to Meet the Challenge of a Modernizing Zimbabwe Defense 
Force.” (Published thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), Springfield, VA.: National 
Technical Information Service, 1998. 
Osipian, A. L. The Impact of Human Capital on Economic Growth: A Case Study in 
Post-Soviet Ukraine, 1989–2009. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
President of Ukraine. Decree of April 17, 2002, № 348/2002, On the State Programme of 
Armed Forces of Ukraine Transition to Manning, Performing Military Service 
Under the Contract. http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/348/2002. 
———. Decree of December 29, 2012, № 771/2012, On the decision of the National 
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of 29 December 2012, On the Strategic 
Defense Bulletin of Ukraine. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/771/2012. 
———. Decree of December 29, 2012, № 772/2012, On Decision of the National 
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of 29 December 2012, On the Concept 
of Reform and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the Period till 
2017. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/772/2012. 
———.  Decree of January 10, 2009, № of 2/2009, On the Decision of the National 
Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of 26 September 2008, On Urgent 
Measures to Raise the Defense of Ukraine. 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2/2009. 
———.  Decree of January 16, 2013, № 20/2013, Some Aspects of the State Emergencies 
Service of Ukraine. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/20/2013.  
———. Decree of June 22, 2004, № 670/2004, On the Decision of the National Security 
and Defense Council of Ukraine of 17.06.2004, On the Strategic Defense Bulletin 
of Ukraine for 2015. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/670/2004. 
———. Decree of June 27, 2008 № 598/2008, On the Decision of the National Security 
and Defense Council of Ukraine of 30 May 200,8 On a Defense Review. 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/598/2008. 
———. Decree of March 3, 2008, № 196/2008, On Immediate Measures to Ensure the 
Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/196/2008. 
———. Decree of 08.06.2012 № 389/2012, On Decision of the National Security and 
Defense Council of Ukraine on June 8, 2012, On the New Version of the National 
Security Strategy of Ukraine. http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/389/2012.  
 77 
Rakhmanin ,Sergey. “Спаситель на белом танке (The Savior on a White Tank),” 
Gazeta, March 1, 2013. http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/spasitel-na-belom-tanke-
_.html?page=6&items=52. 
“SBU Fast Demilitarization Is Impossible,” ForUm News, April 24, 2013. http://en.for-
ua.com/news/2013/04/24/142522.html.  
Sewell, A. F. Prospects for Improving the Resource Allocation Process for National 
Security in Jamaica: A Comparative Study. Ft. Belvoir, Virginia: Defense 
Technical Information Center, 2004. 




Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992.(Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, 1990. 
Tymchuk, Dmitry. “Defense Minister Mikhail Ezhel: ‘Ukrainian military should become 
representative of the middle class,’” Флот – 2017, April 21, 2010, 
http://flot2017.com/item/opinions/22677. 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Budget Code of Ukraine of July 8, 2010, № 2456-VI, 
Article 55. http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2456–
17/print1366176374220905.  
———. Constitution Act of June 28, 1996, № 254k/96-VR. 
http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80. 
———. Law of December 6, 1991, № 1932-XII, On Defense of Ukraine, Article 2. 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1932–12.   
———. Law of December 20, 2005, № 3235-IV, On the State Budget of Ukraine for 
2006, Article 88. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3235–
15/print1364237936225598.  
———. Law of July 1, 2010, № 2411-VI, On Domestic and Foreign Policy. 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2411–17. 
———. Law of November 18, 2004, № 2198-IV, On Defense Planning. 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2198–15. 
———. Law of Ukraine, On State Budget of Ukraine for 2008 and Amendments to 
Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine, Article 74. 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/107–17/print1364237936225598.  
 78 
Weber, Max. “Politics as a Vocation.” In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited 
by Gerth and Mills, 77–83. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946. 






INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
 
